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ABSTRACT 
The first military coup of Pakistan in 1958 set up a pattern that continues to show itself 
four decades later and dominate the government either directly or indirectly.  The first 
military coup of Pakistan also created an institutional path for the subsequent three 
military coups.  The first military coup was due to various factors, not just one that civil 
military theorists neglect to explain.  The British recruitment policy during the pre-
partition period had as large a role in creating the setting for the coup as did unequal 
distribution of resources and geographical location.  Pakistani military at the time of 
partition was professional while the other institutions were weak, which challenges the 
notion that professional military do not cause coups.  The Pakistani military also gained 
prominence because of the all-around external and internal threats.  The powerful 
military and bureaucratic alliance further delayed the enactment of a constitution and 
changed seven prime ministers within first eleven years of independence by further 
discrediting the politicians before the people.  All these events provided occasion, 
opportunity and disposition to the Pakistan army to affect the first coup by General Ayub 
Khan in 1958.  The thesis also evaluates the effects of the first military coup on the 
present civil-military relations in Pakistan.  
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The first military coup of 1958, led by General Ayub Khan, has set up a pattern in 
Pakistan where today, most of the policy matters, such as the foreign or domestic are 
crafted with the tacit approval of the Pakistani military.  The Pakistani military continues 
to dominate the government either directly at the center or indirectly in charge of several 
institutions. This core imbalance in civil-military affairs is primarily due to what Pakistan 
inherited at the time of the independence of Pakistan.   
A. BACKGROUND 
Muslims were traditional warriors who conquered the subcontinent in the late 
fourteenth century by defeating Hindu Emperors or Rajas who ruled the Indian 
Subcontinent for almost eight hundred years.1  The population of the subcontinent, at that 
time, was primarily Hindu and Buddhist.2  Due to the prolonged rule of Muslims in India, 
the Muslims were able to convert some segments of the population to Islam.  They 
mostly settled in the provinces of East Bengal, Punjab, Frontier Baluchistan and Sind, the 
areas that are now Pakistan.  By the 16th century, the Mughals dominated the reins of 
power in the Indian subcontinent.  However, they did not try to force their religion 
(Islam) on the Hindus, the majority population. 
1. British Period   
The British entered the sub-continent in 18th century as traders. By 1858, they 
overthrew the Muslim empire in order to protect their interests and ruled India until 
1947.3 The British took over the government of India, which changed the status of 
Muslims from rulers to subjugate.4  On the other hand, for Hindus it meant adapting from 
                                                 
1 Chuadhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, Lahore Research Society of Pakistan (Lahore 
Pakistan Punjab University, 2003) 2–3. 
2 Stephen Philip Cohen, introduction to The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2004), 10. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Jaswant Singh, Jinnah India-Partition Independence (New Delhi: Rupa.Co, 2009), 25, 26. 
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one invader to another.  The British employed the tactic of divide and rule to disintegrate 
the Hindu-Muslim coexistence for administrative convenience.5 Dividing tactics 
prolonged the role of the British as mediators, which further aggravated cleavages 
between the two communities.6 The first victim of the British Raj was the Persian 
language, which was replaced by English as the official language.  Hindus were quick to 
adapt to the new system of governance; they acquired education-related opportunities in 
the government, learned the English language and dominated the higher jobs in the 
administration.7  The Muslims, however, abhorred the West and the English language, 
which resulted in their economic and material isolation.  The Mullahs (Muslim clergy) 
further enhanced the isolationist Muslim psyche by issuing decrees forbidding learning 
the English language.8  The British also maneuvered to confine their privileges to Hindus 
to isolate and discriminate Muslims from mainstream prosperity.9  Muslims felt alienated 
and were discriminated against because of their changed status, identity, and relegation to 
the minority population.  Muslims were convinced that their future role in a united 
democratic India would be one of subservience to the Hindus after the departure of the 
British, and the Hindus, with a ratio of one to three, would continue to dominate in the 
electoral constituencies.10    
B. POLITICAL INHERITANCE AND THE STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN 
BEFORE INDEPENDENCE   
A country may have different sets of ethnic minorities, groups of people who may 
have different ideas, beliefs and caste systems; however, strong political leadership that 
has deep roots among the people can only fill this gap and keep a nation united.  India 
and Pakistan came into being as a result of a political movement under the leadership of 
Mohan Das Gandhi, Pundit Nehru and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who were instrumental in 
                                                 
5 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), 4. 
6 Singh, Jinnah India, 27.  
7 Ali, The Emergence Pakistan, 6, 7. 
8 Abbas, Pakistan into Extremism, 5. 
9 Muhammad Munir, From Jinnah To Zia (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1979), 4. 
10 Ali, Emergence of Pakistan, 11. 
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the mobilization of the people on the platforms of Congress (majority Hindu 
representative party) and Muslim League (Muslim representative party).  They also 
played a central role in the independence of India and Pakistan.   
Right from the onset, there was no comparison between the two political parties.  
Congress had cemented its foundations deeply among the populace due to its longer 
existence and organizational breadth.  The Congress Party (INC) was formed in 1885 
after a long demand by its leaders.11  After 1920, especially, Gandhi brought forth many 
reforms on the basis of a joint consensus in the party and encouraged representation of 
the people from all walks of life.  Rizvi argues that the struggle for independence enabled 
Congress members to evolve patterns to resolve internal conflicts and aggregate diverse 
interests.  These measures not only empowered the leaders, but also managed to win the 
confidence of the people.  Nehru nurtured democratic institutions, within the party as 
well at the national level.12  As a result, Congress won the 1937 elections, the first that 
granted full suffrage, forming governments in eight out of eleven provinces.  During 
these elections, a large number of Muslims also voted for Congress.  Thus, the Congress 
Party managed to develop a nationwide political base among the people of the Indian 
subcontinent well before independence.  Congress’ astute leadership even managed to 
cultivate some Muslim leaders, such as Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad and Zakir Hussain, 
who voted against the partition of India.13 
Whereas the Muslim League miserably failed to emerge in the 1937 elections as 
either a true representative of Muslims or a national party, it later successfully 
orchestrated the nationalist movement of Pakistan.   The Muslim League was formed by 
Muslims from an elite class in 1906 with a view to protect the interests of the Muslims of 
the Indian subcontinent. The Muslim League, however, kept struggling to become a truly 
Muslim representative party until 1939–40, due to widespread divisions within the 
                                                 
11Encyclopedia Britannica, Indian-”National-Congress,” 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/285841/Indian-National-CongressRizvi (accessed December 
2, 2012). 
12 Yogendra K. Malik, Government and Politics of South India (New York: West View Press, Sixth 
Edition, 2008), 35.  
13 Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 26. 
 4
Muslims.  Even the great leader of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, remained an active 
member of the Congress.  Jinnah and Congress leaders were in a joint “quit India 
movement” against the British.  At this stage, Jinnah was also known as the ambassador 
of Hindu Muslim unity.  He later joined the Muslim League, in 1935, when he realized 
that after the departure of British, the Muslims would be marginalized and relegated to a 
minority, not only in the country but within the party.  Gandhi had formed a unity party 
that included some of the Hindu Nationalists.  Thus, he became a staunch supporter of the 
two-nation theory, which meant that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations and 
both had separate identities and traditions.  From 1929 onward, Congress and the 
Muslims remained under the same unification umbrella to eject the British from India. 
The Muslim league also lacked any internal cohesion or collective leadership and 
its credibility was often challenged by other Muslim parties.  It was only after the 1937 
elections that the Muslim League emerged as a strong Muslim unification party, once 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah managed to convince the Muslims of India that their survival 
rested only in a separate state for Muslims.  He also managed to attract the most 
prominent Muslim leaders under one Muslim League umbrella.  However, this 
unification of the Muslim leaders actually took place too late, just two to three years 
before the creation of Pakistan, in 1944–1947.14 Thus, the Muslim League had very 
limited experience as a grassroots party.  The center of gravity of the Muslim League 
remained Jinnah, as his charismatic personality overshadowed the rest of the Muslim 
Leaguers.   
Cohen argues that although leaders like Jinnah mobilized the Muslims toward one 
cause, “these leaders, were half converted preachers of democracy, though well-educated 
and half westernized elite of Indian subcontinent.  These leaders had no practical 
experience of running democratic systems.”15 What these modern leaders did not 
understand was that modernization also involves change in behavioral attitudes.  
Democratization also requires institutionalization of the complete system, including 
                                                 
14 Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore: Pakistan. Sang-e-Meel 
publications, 2000), 61. 
15 Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 29–30. 
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social values, political parties and rules of law.  The point to bring home, here, is that 
unity among Muslim political leaders was lacking even before the partition of the 
subcontinent also. 
One important variable in the military intervention of Pakistan, but not in India, 
was the issue of governance and leadership prior to the independence of both countries.  
Therefore, there was no backup available in case of the demise of Jinnah.  Later, 
circumstances proved this problem to be real, as after the death of Jinnah, the Muslim 
League failed to transform itself from a nationalist movement to a national party.  Rizvi 
argues that the “Muslim league failed to form the diverse political culture and identities 
of Pakistani citizens into one united platform after the demise of Jinnah.”16   
C. THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN AT INDEPENDENCE   
After independence, Jinnah centralized the powers by becoming the governor 
general and president of the constituent assembly of Pakistan.  Instead of empowering the 
constituent assembly and parliament, however, he centralized all authority, in the 
governor’s office, laying down the wrong foundation for a democratic Pakistan.17  Jinnah 
and his party’s (Muslim League) main objective was the creation of Pakistan and the 
leadership totally focused on this aspect; nobody thought about the political and 
economic next.  Still, when scholars debate the reasons for the existence of Pakistan, 
some argue that the objective of Pakistan was to create an Islamic state, whereas others 
argue that Jinnah’s vision was to create a modern progressive Pakistan where the masses 
would have equal rights.   
India and Pakistan became independent on 14–15 August 1947, respectively, 
when the British withdrew from the Indian subcontinent.  Rizvi argues that the effect of 
circumstances leading to independence carry deep impacts on the outlook of new nations 
and ensuing events.18  Pakistan was no exception to this experience.  It underwent the 
                                                 
16 Hassan-Askari Rizvi, introduction to Military State and Society in Pakistan (New York: Macmillan 
Press, 2000), 4. 
17 Ibid., 4–5.  
18 Ibid., Military and Politics, 51. 
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traumatized experience of starting from an insurmountable load of problems.  The 
departing British gave only eleven days (to a joint committee of Indians and Pakistanis) 
to divide the resources between the two countries, which they had taken almost a hundred 
years to build.19  That is why scholars often describe Pakistan as “a nation that was born 
in a hurry.”20  Rizvi points out that pre-independence distrust between the Indian and 
Pakistani political leadership, by the time both countries achieved independence, had 
already turned to hostility.  Pakistan received its first setback just one year after 
independence when its great founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, died in 1948, which not 
only delayed the formation of a constitution but also left the country in political chaos.21 
After the death of Jinnah, the Muslim League lost momentum and direction.  Jinnah was 
a leader who acted as a nucleus and had brought the party together despite a wide range 
of differences among the party leaders.  His demise, therefore, further widened the gap 
between politicians.  This factor added further miseries to the bitter reality, 
Pakistan was also handicapped after independence, as the politicians and most of 
the senior Muslim League leaders holding ministerial positions in the cabinet had no 
roots among the majority of people, as they were migrants from the Muslim minority 
provinces of Northern India.22  The absence of political roots was a large obstacle for 
migrated politicians.  Rizvi argues that “distrust continued to taint their interaction in the 
post-independence period.”23  These events further weakened the political structure of 
Pakistan.  Shuja Nawaz explains that compared to India, Pakistan clearly suffered from 
competent and a capable leadership during this period.  The vacuum left by the weak 
political leadership was soon filled by the army, which was the only institution that was 
intact, cohesive and powerful.  
                                                 
19  Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 25. 
20 Shuja, Crossed Swords, 3. 
21Ibid., 100. 
22 Ibid., 100–101. 
23 Rizvi, State and Society, 5. 
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1. Economic Inheritance 
Another major setback for Pakistan at the time of independence was unfairness in 
the transfer of resources by India, in collusion with the British. It included the unjust 
demarcation of geographical boundaries, including Kashmir.  These problems were 
further compounded due to a mass influx of refugees, who later formed 10 percent of the 
population of the resource-starved new state of Pakistan.  The seeds of hatred were thus 
sown between the two countries, which later fought three wars that resulted in the 
ascendency of the Pakistani army as a political institution.  Under the British, the major 
defense and industrial infrastructure was based in what became India.  It included all the 
major financial institutions, state banks, steel mills and seven ordnance factories.24   These 
factors made India not only financially better, but also in a stronger bargaining position 
with Pakistan.  Jalal argues, “One determined to deny the resources and the other eager to 
receive.”25   During the process of resources distribution, the role of the departing British 
had been relegated to the level of arbitrator only and thus, they had no say over the 
distribution of resources.  The distribution of resources was left to the mercy of powerful 
Indian leaders.  Cohen argues that India not only betrayed Pakistan as far as allocation of 
resources was concerned, but also forged a bond with the British to manipulate 
international boundaries, and connived with some of the rulers of the Muslim majority 
princely state, who as per the partition plan, were supposed to annex with Pakistan, 
including Jammu and Kashmir.26  
Pakistan was given only one-third of its financial share by India. By insistence, 
Pakistan was given 200 million rupees to start afresh.27  Thus, Pakistan started with 
meager resources and no industrial setup compared to India.  During the process of 
resource distribution, the 1948 War of Kashmir also broke out.  This event led India to 
deny further resources to its new enemy, Pakistan. 
                                                 
24 Ibid., The Military and Politics, 43. 
25 Jalal, Martial Rule, 33. 
26 Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 47. 
27 Jalal, Martial Rule, 34. 
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Uncertainty about the creation of Pakistan and its start, with negligible resources, 
led Indian and British leaders to believe that the new state would not survive long.28  
These speculations led to the transfer of an enormous amount of money from Pakistan to 
India. Jalal says that 3,000 million rupees (alone) were transferred from Pakistani Punjab 
to India, by the migrants.29 
2. Lack of Trained Bureaucrats   
Soon after independence, Pakistan was trapped in insurmountable problems as it 
had neither resources nor trained bureaucracy.  It had to start everything from scratch.30  
Jalal argues that one of the mammoth tasks for Pakistan was to establish a capital at 
“Karachi,” which included the shifting of manpower and records from Delhi.  She points 
out that, to start with, Pakistan had only 157 civil servants; Cohen states that Pakistan had 
only 80 civil servants, whereas India had more than 1,400 trained civil servants at the 
time of partition.31  This was because before the independence of both countries, the 
literacy rate amongst Hindus was very high compared to Muslims due to Hindu 
participation in the English schools early on.  The percentage of Hindu bureaucrats in the 
Indian Civil Service was 82 percent, whereas, Muslims were only 5 percent, because of 
their poor literacy level.32  Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard Goetze, Jr., while citing Max 
Weber, argue that the: 
Decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always 
been its technical superiority over other form of organization. The fully 
developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations 
(such as army) exactly, as does the machine with non-mechanical modes 
of production.  
Thus, the scarcity of civil bureaucrats was an important factor that led to the start of weak 
democratic control over the military. 
                                                 
28 Rizvi, State and Society, 43, and Jalal, Martial Rule, 26. 
29 Jalal, Martial Rule, 36; Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 41. 
30 Rizvi, State and Society, 59.  
31 Jalal, Martial Rule, 31. 
32 Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 41. 
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3. Lack of Central Infrastructure   
Another major difference between India and Pakistan was India’s already 
established central infrastructure at the “capital,” New Delhi, which it inherited from the 
British prior to partition. For this reason, India did not face any administrative problems 
as all the official records and necessary infrastructure, including the state bank, major 
financial institutions, and all industries, continued to work as usual after the transition of 
power from Britain to India. 
4. Refugees’ Problems  
From its birth, Pakistan was deluged in immense socio-political problems, 
augmented by a poor infrastructure and its economy in shambles, which created an 
anarchy-like situation.33  Approximately one hundred thousand refugees were killed or 
massacred on the way to Pakistan.34  The number of refugees who needed to be housed 
and given food was approximately one million, and these later formed 10 percent of the 
population of Pakistan.  
The Pakistani army, which was ill equipped, with a total strength of one hundred 
and forty thousand officers and men, and had other challenges also, which will be 
discussed in Chapter II, was over-stretched to safely escort these refugees from India.35  
5. Ethnicity Problems and the Separation of Two Wings  
Pakistan also faced challenges of administration of its two wings, East (now 
Bangladesh) and West Pakistan, which were separated by 1,500 miles of India 
(approximately).36  East Pakistan was also the least developed province due to British 
extortion of its rich resources over the centuries, and because the region is prone to floods 
and monsoons rains.  Therefore, the population of East Pakistan was the poorest in the 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 256, 261, 262. 
34 Wikipedia, s.v. “Partition of India,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_India (accessed 
December 12, 2012). 
35 Rizvi, State and Society, 52. 
36 Ibid., 59. 
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whole of India.  Moreover, the population of both East and the West Pakistan had 
different ethnic backgrounds.  Rizvi argues that these problems were further compounded 
due to geographical differences between the East and West, with hostile India in 
between.37  It was, therefore, difficult for the religion, which formed the basis for the 
creation of Pakistan, to hold the two wings of Pakistan together, especially for a newly 
emerging, resource-starved state like Pakistan.38  The civilian leadership had neither the 
resources nor the capability to administer the two wings.  Thus, its dependence on the 
army to run the administration increased in the early years.   
Jinnah made his first fatal mistake after the creation of Pakistan, when he 
designated Urdu (the West Pakistani dialect) as the national language, much to the 
chagrin of the majority Bengalis. The Eastern politicians soon started accusing the people 
of the West of depriving them of all the resources.  This issue sowed the first seed of 
hatred between the people and the political leadership of the two wings, which continued 
to grow with time, and later culminated in the creation of Bangladesh.  
6. The Pakistani Army and Defense Resources   
It is important to understand the British control of Indian armed forces prior to 
partition because it shows why the Punjabis have more association with the Pakistani 
army.  Rizvi argues that the British had kept the army troops at the ratio of 56 percent 
from Punjab, which later formed Pakistan, because (1) the British minimized recruitment 
from the Hindu majority areas because they stopped trusting them after they instigated a 
civil disobedience/quit India movement against British (1905–1911).39  (2) These regions 
(Punjab and Frontier) had a favorable disposition toward the army; therefore, the British 
relied more on the Muslims for recruitment. 40 (3) The people of Punjab were not only 
obedient, but also better warriors. (4) The British earned good will among the majority of 
Punjabi soldiers (martial races), who after returning home from leave or war or on 
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retirement, spoke generally very highly of the British Raj.  They thereby generated good 
will toward the British among the people of Punjab and Frontier.  The British, through 
the military, also penetrated the local civil society, while interacting with the elite and 
upper strata.  (5) The British also, handsomely compensated   soldiers in the form of 
generous cash rewards and agricultural land.  This step further created military as well 
British good will among the locals (an area that later formed part of Pakistan).  The 
people of Punjab, therefore, preferred joining the army and considered it a prestigious 
and honorable profession.  Recruitment from the Hindu majority regions was 
comparatively small; therefore, the people of India could not develop the same kind of 
affiliation or bonds with the Indian military, later on compared to the Pakistani military.41   
Cohen points out also that at the time of independence, the Pakistani army was 
dominated by Punjabis and Pathans, and that the representation of Punjabis in the British 
army, before the partition was more than 54 percent (the majority of the area later formed 
part of Pakistan), whereas in India, the army ratio represented the national population.42  
In Pakistan, even up to the present time, 70 percent of the cadre of the officers’ corps and 
soldiers are recruited from the province of Punjab and, the remainder from the Frontier 
province, purely on a volunteer basis.  
At the time of the independence of Pakistan, the distribution of armed forces and 
shares was to be done based on a ratio of 66:34 (for India and Pakistan, respectively).43  
However, both armies developed serious differences over the distribution of military 
assets after partition.  In principle, it was agreed that Pakistan would receive its one-third 
of the share; however, India refused to release the share due Pakistan.44  In this share 
distribution, India had the clear advantage as most of the defense stores were located in 
India.  In the meantime, the Kashmir War broke out and India became even more 
stringent in the division of stores.  The three key command workshops were left in India.  
Out of forty-six training establishments, only seven existed in Pakistan.  Three out of 
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seventeen ordnance factories were located in Pakistan.  Pakistan’s request to dismantle 
the proportionate machinery was also rejected by India.  Rizvi states that much-needed 
items like military ammunition, tanks and other munitions were also denied by India.45  
Rizvi explains that “the military always occupies distinctive position when new nations 
emerge.”46  The army leadership was more organized, while civilian institutions were 
very fragile. The Pakistani military leadership soon started looking towards developed 
world to seek training.47  Due to unfriendly neighbors and emerging war rhetoric with 
India on the Kashmir issue, the civilian leadership also felt the need to procure new 
equipment and modernize its military as per Western training standards. 
7. Internal Challenges  
Unlike India, the newborn state of Pakistan faced secessionist movements in two 
out of a total of four provinces, immediately after the partition, as the two provinces 
showed a reluctance to cede into Pakistan.48  They were fearful of the majority Punjabi 
dominance.  The ruler of Kalat, in Baluchistan, also declared its independence and its 
accession to Oman, which resulted in an outbreak of insurgency in Baluchistan.  Rizvi 
argues that “Afghanistan also began to manifest interest in the future of the Pathans living 
on the east of the Durand Line when it became clear that the British were leaving 
India.”49 Instances of raid on some parts of Frontier province by some of the tribal, on the 
behest of Afghanistan also came to light.  The weak civilian government had no option 
but to request the army leadership to suppress the insurgency.50   
8. External Challenges   
This paper will later argue that one of the root causes of the ascendency of the 
Pakistani army lay in an existential threat to Pakistan from India.  Rizvi argues that for 
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Indian leaders, the creation of Pakistan was a shock for the secular identity of India.  The 
seeds of friction and hatred further grew because of the dispute with Kashmir as well as 
India’s military action in Junagadh (a state ruled by a Muslim ruler with a majority of 
Hindus), and annexation of Hyderabad by the Indian army in 1948.51  These 
manifestations of practical actions were further validated by the statements of Hindu 
leaders who openly talked of the reunification of the subcontinent, such as in the Hindu 
Mahasabha election statements of 1951.52  Sardar Patel, in a speech in 1950, mentioned 
“A time might come when India and Pakistan would realize their mistake of partition and 
both the countries would be again be reunited.” 53   These suspicions were further 
confirmed by the Indian occupation of Goa, which generated warning signals for 
Pakistan.  Fear of the external threat by India thus became one of the main policy 
instruments of Pakistani foreign policy.  Similarly, Afghanistan did not recognize the 
existence of Pakistan.  Therefore, the Afghan government, realizing the fact that Pakistan 
was a resource-starved, newly emerged state, instigated an insurgency in the Frontier 
Province, with the help of some locals.  Thus, a constant campaign was launched by 
Afghanistan to annex Frontier Province within its borders.  Rizvi argues that Afghanistan 
had the backing of both India and the Soviet Union.54 
D. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
What were the political and social conditions that led to Pakistan’s first military 
coup in 1958?  Understanding this is important because Pakistan remains one of the few 
countries in the world where the military consistently intervenes in “times of crisis.” 
While there are several explanations offered by various scholars, they tend to be unipolar, 
not recognizing the dual complexity of the social and political settings, which led to 
political struggle among the elite and the presence of a professional military that was 
seeking to assert its authority in the new nation.  The research here will identify the 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 52–53. 
52 Ibid., 52. 
53 Embassy of Pakistan, India’s War Propaganda against Pakistan. White Paper Published by 
Government of Pakistan, 1956, 2 
54 Rizvi, The Military and Politics, 55–56. 
 14
reasons behind the first coup in Pakistan, which laid a path for the military to become one 
of the governing bodies.  In addition, it will explain the impact the first coup had on civil-
military relations by influencing the political and economic institutions and providing the 
groundwork for further coups.  I will explain the setting that led to the first coup, which 
cannot be limited just to the idea of weak politicians leading to “rescue” by the military 
or the idea that the military sought out power and saw an opportunity in a new nation-
state.  While these ideas are all relevant, they do not sufficiently explain what led to the 
first coup in 1958. 
Pakistani history, since independence from the British in 1947, includes four 
successful military coups leading to the formation of a military-dominated state.  The 
civilian regimes between the coups also experienced military interference, which is often 
under-researched by scholars studying Pakistan.  These actions generate questions as to 
why Pakistan has witnessed frequent military interference since its inception.  Generally, 
as democracy spreads across the world, why does military interference remain a cyclical 
issue in Pakistan? I contend that the first military coup in Pakistan by Ayub Khan, created 
an institutional path for the three subsequent military coups.  It brought the military into 
the civilian power structure, which was designed to be a democratic system.  It also 
shaped the nature of civil military relations in the country, which then shaped the future 
activities of the civilian leadership as well as embedded the military in the local politics.  
Why did this occur? The answer lies in understanding the setting, which was going 
through a consolidation phase.  Who were the primary actors and what led to the end of 
democracy in Pakistan in 1958?  Currently, the military leaders continue to play the role 
of kingmakers even when they are not in power.  Exploring the causes of the first military 
intervention will, therefore, help identify the weaknesses in civilian regimes as well the 
power structure of the military, which have resulted in the military’s domination over 
political affairs in Pakistan.   
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E. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This thesis will show the causes behind the first military intervention and its 
impact upon the pattern of civilian-military relations in Pakistan during the first two 
decades.  I will examine the setting in 1947 through 1958 when the coup occurred.  I will 
also examine General Ayub Khan’s regime as it consolidated its power, which then 
shaped the political institutions for decades to come.  
F. IMPORTANCE 
The first military intervention lays the path for subsequent military interventions.  
Therefore, understanding the first coup is not only important for Pakistan, but also for the 
international community, which views Pakistan as an unstable political system where the 
powerful army could step in at any time.  The study gains further significance because 
there is an assumption that  military coups in Pakistan gave rise to instability in the region 
and, due to raw sentiments regarding this concern in Pakistan, no one has so far 
attempted to study this topic.  Especially avoided are considerations that during a civilian 
regime, the military continues to play a dominant role behind the scenes.  Is this because 
the military as an institution is very strong in Pakistan?  The following questions illustrate 
the study’s significant contribution to analysis of not only Pakistan, but also other 
countries where militaries play a powerful political role.  
(i) What was the political structure of the country before and during the 
military intervention and did it contribute to the intervention? 
(ii) What were the roles of external players in shaping the environment in 
favor of the first military intervention?  
(iii) To what extent did the first military coup shape the environment for 
subsequent military interventions in Pakistan?  
(iv) What was the level of friction between the civil government and military 
when the first military intervention was carried out?  
(v) How has the first military coup affected civil-military relations in 
Pakistan? 
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G. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS  
Scholars studying Pakistan are divided over the causal variables for the country’s 
coups.  Many blame the military for preventing consolidation.55 Others blame the civilian 
government for being corrupt and autocratic, leading to an intervention by the military.56 
However, this thesis will show that a combination of factors resulted in the first military 
intervention in Pakistan.  The first coup was a result of the combination of the failure of 
political leadership to establish grass-roots level support among the people, failure of 
political bargaining among them, which then presented opportunities for the military 
seeking a new role in the new country.  In addition, the Pakistani military, under the 
British, had roots among the people, especially among the Punjabis, that allowed it to 
take advantage of the opportunities presented by the political haggling that lasted over a 
decade.  The second to fourth coups were due to a combination of various factors, which 
included the failings of the civilian leadership and the maneuverings of the army in order 
to maintain its newly gained political position.  However, the first coup created a space 
for the military to stay in the civilian political realm as a power group and that aspect 
cannot be under-estimated, especially by the U.S., which often pressures the Pakistani 
military to step out of domestic politics.  Also, one cannot underestimate the role played 
by the U.S. in “allowing” the military to intervene in 1958.  The military, under Ayub 
Khan, became deeply embedded in the country’s economic and power structures. 
H. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to establish a solid methodological framework to answer the research 
questions, a review of the various theories that explain military coups is required.  
Several scholars point to various reasons that could lead to military interventions and the 
consequences of such interventions on civil military relations.  An exploration into this 
literature helps to determine the causes of coup d’états in the world from a historical 
perspective.  I find that although there is vast literature on military interventions, it is 
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incomplete in explaining the Pakistani case.  The conditions in Pakistan illustrate no 
single variable in effecting military interventions.  Therefore, an understanding of various 
factors and variables will help determine the cause of the first military intervention.  
These factors include professionalism, vested and corporate interests, military 
syndicalism, friction between the institutions, weak civilian institutional control, 
politicization, and disposition of the military to intervene.  External influences, such as 
the acquisition of weapons, superior military training, and interests of the super powers 
also played a contributory role.  These contributory factors are divided by categories in 
the following section. 
1. Military Professionalism   
Samuel Huntington discusses military professionalism in The Soldier and the 
State and the sources of praetorianism in Political Order in Changing Societies.57  He 
identifies relevant causes, such as lack of professionalism and non-autonomous military 
and personal interests.58  He argues that with a rise in military professionalism, the 
chances of military intervention decreases and gives rise to an expert, socially responsible 
and professional officer who possesses corporate loyalty and responsibility as do doctors 
and engineers in society.59  These qualities, in turn, make him loyal to the state, which 
prevent him from instigating coups.60  Huntington’s argument centers on making the 
military sterile and neutral by making it professional.61  Janowitz also argues that the 
professional, civilianized, and modern military does not influence coups.62  
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My thesis challenges Huntington’s and Janowitz’s arguments.63 I contend that 
being a centralized and hierarchical organization, the military stands loyal to military 
leadership, rather than a civil government.  This is what happened in Pakistan in 1958, 
when the military followed the orders of the army leadership, by overthrowing the elected 
president.64 Hasan Askari Rizvi states that the armed forces of both Pakistan and India, 
after their independence, inherited many professional characteristics of the British armed 
forces when General Ayub Khan took command of the Pakistani army in January 1951.65 
However, these two militaries followed different paths: the Indian military remained 
subservient to democratic civilian control, while the Pakistani military carried out 
repeated interventions.  However, professionalism has remained an aspect of the military 
in both cases. 
In contrast to Huntington’s theory, Finer argues that it is a professional military 
with its own politically distinct identity that leads to a coup.  He states that a professional 
military is more prone to coups because the military draws a distinction between the 
nation and the government and begins to invent its own notions of national interest.  He 
cites General MacArthur who stated that “I find in existence a new and a dangerous 
concept that members of our armed forces are laying allegiance or loyalty to those who 
temporarily hold the authority of the executive branch of the government rather than the 
country and its constitution.”66 In other words, a professional military may have a 
political identity.  In the Pakistani case, this is apparent as the military was trained as a 
professional organization under the British and remains that way. 
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2. Military Syndicalism   
Military syndicalism occurs when the military believes that the civilian 
government is too incompetent to govern and the military itself is the sole deciding factor 
about what is good or bad for a country.  General Gursel’s coup of 1960 in Turkey is a 
case in point.67 The above-explained group of coup planners was also infused with a 
sense of syndicalism.  Being in the battlefield, they had a strong belief that they knew 
more than the incompetent civilians.68 This played a role in rallying the military against 
the civilian leadership. 
Military syndicalism also flows from professionalism.  Scholars claim that in such 
cases of intervention, the military feels that only the military is competent to judge what 
is good or bad for the armed forces and the country because they are the true 
professionals.  This factor may put the military on a collision course with the 
government.69  Military intervention may also occur when the professional and 
autonomous military fails to aid the government, for instance, as a coercive force to 
suppress the opposition.70 Finer points out that “the very nature of professionalism on 
which Huntington sets such store and which he regards as politically sterile, often thrusts 
the army into a collision with civilian authorities.”71 Thus, the above factors leading to 
coups illustrate that professionalism is not a sufficient condition, by itself, but other 
factors also play a role. 
Stephen Cohen, who has done extensive work in Pakistan and has interviewed 
some of the senior Pakistani military officers, presents some causes of military 
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professional competence compared with the incompetent and corrupt political 
leadership.”72  He also quotes one of the senior Pakistani officers on military 
intervention: 
We intervene because the politicians and civilian bureaucrats are corrupt 
and inefficient.  We are incorrupt and selected on the basis of merit and 
the best of us reach higher ranks, whereas the civilians need no formal 
education to attain higher bureaucratic appointments and their selection is 
based on political reasons, rather than merit.73  
This is what Finer has termed as the sense of Syndicalism or the quality of judgment, 
which firms up the belief in the military, that it is more loyal and patriotic to the state 
than the government.  I contend that one of the reasons for the first coup was the failure 
of the political leadership to govern and to provide grass roots level support to the people.  
A growing divide amongst the politicians resulted in seven prime ministers and eight 
assemblies in the eleven-year history of Pakistan.74  In addition, the military, which was 
a professional organization, grew to believe that it was the only professional organization 
in the country. 
3. Patriotism   
Cohen’s research shows that Pakistani army officers also claim power because 
“they consider themselves more patriotic to the nation than the civilians.”75 The 
conspiracies of two coups during the first eleven years show that the officers who 
planned the coups were all professional and patriotic officers who had fought in the 
Kashmir War and liberated 40 percent of Kashmir from the more powerful India.76 These 
officers planned a coup because of the government’s cease-fire decision during the 
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Kashmir War of 1948.  The sense of patriotism made them believe that the civilian 
government was inefficient and weak and not patriotic enough to take Kashmir from 
India.   
4. Class and Corporate Interests   
Finer also points to the importance of social class in the military.  He argues that 
the “military supports the civilian power when it is drawn from the same social class and 
overthrows it when it is drawn from different social class.”77 He also argues that 
corporate interests are a strong cohesive force that binds the military together.  The 
interests become corporate when the military shares common values.78 The military 
leadership also ensures that the military become members of the same corporate culture.  
For example, the Pakistani military benefits from various welfare schemes.  This welfare 
includes free housing, land, and membership in exclusive clubs.  Access to these benefits 
and facilities is denied non-military members. The Pakistani elite also ensure that military 
members come from the same social class by changing their economic conditions.  
Moskowitz links military corporateness to two sets of forms, substantive and 
associate. Substantive interests are direct and they include autonomy and institutional 
cohesion.  Associate interests are indirect and they indicate the military’s desire to 
achieve a certain level of control over land and captured territory.  The desire by the 
Pakistani military to retain control over the captured territory of India is a case in point.79 
This shows that the military intervenes when its corporate interests are threatened. 
5. Disposition, Mood and Opportunity to Intervene   
Finer argues that disposition comprises the mood and the motive.  “It is the self-
awareness that permits the army to conceive that it has the unique duty to watch over the 
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national interest.”80 It makes the military feel that it is aware of its special and separate 
identity, distinguishing it from civilians, with a sense of overwhelming power.81 It 
happens when the military assumes that it is the sole power holder in a country.   Mood 
and motive incite the military to intervene when the military leadership has some 
grievances against the government on political issues.82 General Ayub’s mood to 
intervene in 1958 can be gauged from Wint’s 1958 report on Ayub’s coup.  Wint says: 
The Pakistan army had gained prestige and the people despised politicians.  
The army was conspicuously efficient and incorrupt.  Thus, an imbalance 
developed between the respected army and the corrupt and inefficient 
politicians.  The army might have moved earlier to intervene; however, the 
military desisted from intervening because its commanders had inherited 
the traditions from British that it should stay aloof from politics.83 
Wint writes that, finally, the East Bengal parliament impelled General Ayub to act.  He 
concludes, “None of the politicians which the army despised dared to protest.  They 
simply withdrew.”84 Some of the people of Pakistan also supported what he terms the 
“revolution of 1958 in Pakistan.”85  
6. Politicization   
Politicization of the military is considered a process that is the opposite of 
military professionalism.86 Kotera Bhimaya argues that public policies include public 
politics, individuals and pressure groups.  He maintains that the military may participate 
in one group without taking part in others.  The second effect of politicization is military 
participation in policy formulation and decision-making processes, directly or 
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indirectly.87 Moskowitz argues that the politicization may be of two types, overt and 
induced.  Overt politicization occurs once the army gets directly involved in the decision-
making processes, whereas induced politicization arises as a result of civil-military 
relations in a country.88  I contend that the Pakistani army was politicized soon after the 
creation of Pakistan because of a weak civilian government and divided politicians.  The 
army leadership was given frequent opportunities by certain members of the political 
leadership to involve themselves in public affairs, which opened the doors to political 
power for the military elite. 
7. Lack of Institutionalism and Economic Causes   
Professor Robert Looney and Shahid Javed Burki also throw some light on 
military interventions.  They argue that democracy failed in Pakistan because politicians 
were not able to design a set of institutions that could prevail over the interests of the 
narrow elite.  From 1947 to 1958, democracy failed because of conflict between the two 
social groups, which sought to dominate the political stage.  The first group had worked 
hard to create Pakistan.  Most of the people who belonged to it, lived outside the 
boundaries of the new country; once this group migrated to Pakistan, they began to 
compete with the indigenous economic and social elite for a place on the political stage.  
Most of the indigenous had opposed the idea of the new country.  The conflict between 
these two groups delayed the process of giving the country a durable and permanent 
framework, to the point that the economy came to a near collapse and provided the 
military the opportunity and a reason to intervene.89   
8. External Influence   
Scholars of military interventions are divided over the role of external players or 
the international environment in shaping the local environment.  Huntington, in Political 
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Order in Changing Societies argues that “no convincing evidence exists of a correlation 
between American military aid and military involvement in politics.” 90 In contrast, 
scholars from developing countries see a strong relationship between external influences, 
such as military aid, which may have an effect on military intervention.  Rizvi, Shuja 
Nawaz, and Ayesha Jalal argue that the quest for modern technology brought the military 
leadership closer to the West.91 Ayesha Jalal says that the “U.S. role in Pakistan directly 
encouraged the military leaders to dominate their control over the civilians.”92 Shuja 
Nawaz stated that the U.S.-Pakistani friendship, after independence, was “more of civil to 
military rather than military to military.”93 Jalal argues that understanding why the 
military came to power requires careful scrutiny of different ways, which are the 
interplay of the regional, domestic, and international factors.  Both arguments hold merit 
when it comes to understanding what happened during the first coup. 
9. Military as Savior of the State and Connectivity between the People   
Rizvi provides an argument that shows the connectivity between the state and the 
military in the colonial phase is also an important cause.  Rizvi argues that Ayub Khan 
was a British-trained officer who had inherited the same power structure, influence, and 
training of the British armed forces when he took over command of the Pakistani army in 
January 1951.94 He also says that being from the majority province of Punjab-Hazara, 
Ayub Khan represented the majority Punjabis.  Thus, people had developed affection for 
him, while they viewed civilians, who came from other regions of India, as inefficient.95 
Ayesha Siddiqa argues that the military, in people’s perspective, was considered a 
guarantor of the state’s survival because it was rooted in the region.96 People were 
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convinced that Pakistan's troubled relations with India and territorial disputes with 
Afghanistan would only be resolved through the army, which many felt was embedded in 
the region, unlike the political leadership that came from central India as Muhajirs 
(refugees).  Hussain Haqqani argues that the Pakistani military deliberately weakened the 
political structure of the country in order to consolidate its political power.97 
10. Rise of Friction   
Alfred Stepan argues that the military intervenes when friction between civilians 
and the military reaches a certain level.98 He logically relates the civil-military relations 
in some countries of South America to the friction between the military and the 
democratic government in Pakistan?99 Jordan Thomas also used this model to determine 
the level of civil-military friction in Turkey.100 He says that military coups occur when 
the level of friction between the two institutions crosses acceptable limits.  In Pakistan, 
the first signs of civil-military friction appear when General Ayub Khan was promoted to 
Army Chief, after superseding his two seniors.  However, due to the hierarchical nature 
of the army, the resentments soon died down.   
Obtaining and analyzing data from the selected four military coups and drawing 
conclusions will require an understanding of variable values, the causes of friction 
between civil-military relations, and their effects.  Stepan is famous for explaining how a 
democratic regime, in which the military was highly politicized, could change into a 
democracy capable of civilian control of the military.  He measured civil-military 
relations in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Spain as a function of the relative power and 
friction between military and elected governments.101   
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I adapt the same model by defining four extreme edges of civil-military friction 
and military political power with the help of the following figure.  The lower left corner 
of the figure depicts the ideal model of democratic civilian control where both friction 
and military power are low.  Civilian control implies complete subservience of the 
military to elected officials.  In this corner of the graph, it can be seen that civilians have 
more control over the military with regard to political issues and issues related to control 
over the defense budget.  The United States and United Kingdom are cases in point where 
civilians exclusively control the defense budget, yet no signs of rifts are seen.   
However, if the military attains more power compared to civilian institutions, as 
was the case in Pakistan, the military gains more prerogatives giving rise to civil-military 
tensions (see Figure 1)”  In the first decade, civil-military friction rose in two forms.  
First, it was not clear how the new civilian leadership was going to handle the military, so 
different in India, where the Congress Party moved decisively to claim its position over 
the military by negotiating an institutional agreement; in Pakistan the power vacuum left 
a lot to power-grabbing among the politicians and some members of the military.  
Second, democratic elections would have replaced West Pakistani leadership with East 
Pakistani leadership, which was not reflected in the Punjabi majority military.  This also 
made the military very insecure with West Pakistan politicians.  This was reflected in the 
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Figure 1.   Stepan’s Model: Weak Political and Civilian Institutions:103  
Thomas Bruneau and Richard Goetze discuss how civilians can exert internal and 
external control over the military through institutional control such as spending.  This 
includes the MOD as well an effective and efficient bureaucracy and legislators.104 The 
military budget was subsequently increased during the first decade of Pakistan’s 
independence, due to an existential threat from India.  With the army chief as defense 
minister, there were no checks and balances on the military’s spending.  Rizvi argues that 
later on, the weak political government, in order to appease the army, kept its budget at 
an average of 60 percent of total expenditures until the occurrence of the coup.105 Shuja 
Nawaz argues that the army’s influence increased because of shortages of trained civil 
servants and delays in framing the constitution.  He points out that “Pakistan’s history is a 
conflict between an underdeveloped political system and the powerful army that grew in 
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political strength and numbers.”106 The history of Pakistan and the circumstances that 
shaped its political structure and the emergence of its military will be argued in Chapter I, 
as well the evolution of civil military-relations at the time of Pakistan’s independence.   
11. Crises of Leadership and Governance   
Shuja Nawaz argues that Pakistan faced serious leadership crises immediately 
after the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and, due to the absence of any other acceptable 
leadership, has been facing leadership and governing crises ever since.107   
In contrast, in The State of Martial Rule, Ayesha Jalal rejects the idea that the 
weakness of the political system was the main variable explaining the first military 
intervention in Pakistan.  She argues that in the quest for survival, the Pakistani military 
rose to a position of dominance.  She attributes military intervention to a nexus between 
the top military and civil bureaucracies of Pakistan, which deliberately dismantled and 
derailed the political process.  She also points toward the influences of London and 
Washington as contributory factors to military interventions in Pakistan.108   
I see a combination of factors that explains Pakistan’s history of military coups.  
First, the strongest factor was the powerful, professional, and opportunist military 
leadership, which found the occasion, disposition, and opportunity that was presented by 
a weak and disconnected political leadership.  In addition, being a new state, there was 
fear for survival, which led the patriotic military to support military intervention.  I will 
show that weak political institutions contributed to the professional military’s sense of 
connectivity to the new state, which was forming under a new regime after 1947.  
Without doubt, the first coup had an effect on how the civil government worked 
with the military.  The thirty-two years of military rule in the country are testimony to 
this.  After the death of General Zia ul Haq in 1988, there was a common perception that 
the military would not take over again.  However, the 1999 coup, by General Musharraf, 
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showed that the army is still a powerful political force.  The prior coups were pro-active, 
while the coup of 1999, by General Musharraf, was reactive.109 Although the reasons 
were different, the heightened tensions in civil-military relations, which have their roots 
in the 1958 coup, continue to contribute to the coups.  
Currently, the tilt of civil-military relations in Pakistan is in favor of the army.  It 
continues to remain at the helm of affairs as an arbitrator, while earlier it played the role 
of a ruler.  Recent policy statements, which should come from civilian elected rulers, 
continue to be transmitted from army headquarters.110 The political leadership and the 
people still view the army as a kingmaker in the country.  I will show the role the 
Pakistani army continues to play in the present democratic setup in my conclusion.    
I. METHODOLOGY 
A process-tracing method will be used to establish the dependent and independent 
variables determining the causes of coups and military interventions.  It will also help 
identify the causes of rising military power vis-à-vis weak political institutions.  The 
corporate interests of the military and its mood regarding intervention will also be 
analyzed through the process-tracing method.  Military interventions and levels of 
friction have been identified as independent variables.  Stepan’s model helps establish the 
causes of friction in civilian-military relations.  I will rely on three sources of 
information: newspapers, archives, and research and academic books and journals.  
Electronic and Internet sources will also be used to access relevant data. 
J. THESIS OVERVIEW 
I divide my arguments into four chapters.  Chapter II covers the cause and the 
setting for the first military coup.  Chapter III covers military rule (1958–1969) and civil-
military relations during that period.  It also discusses the economic conditions of the 
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country during the period of General Ayub Khan.  Chapter IV is the conclusion and a 
description of the impact of the first coup on future civil-military relations in Pakistan. 
 31
II. UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST MILITARY COUP 
A successful coup is considered to set the pattern for civil-military relations in a 
country.  In Pakistan, the first successful coup occurred in 1958.  This chapter provides 
the background and the causes of the first military coup in Pakistan, which was led by 
General Ayub Khan. The first coup changed the role of the military in the country and 
had a deep impact on subsequent civil-military relations in the sub-continent.  What led 
to the coup and its specific consequences are the focus of this chapter.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Militaries often play various roles in state formation and war making, from 
implementing state leaders’ policies to intervening in politics—either by accepting being 
used in political disagreements, refusing to comply with the political elites’ demands, or 
via coups. Charles Tilly illustrates that the politicization of the military is not a new 
phenomenon and dates back to 1400 BC when the Roman and Greek empires used 
militaries extensively to expand their dynasties and against internal opponents.111  
At the beginning of the 20th century (1917–1955), there were 28 new states 
formed in the world and, out of these, 13 states suffered coups.112  Between 1950 and 
2011, there were approximately 190 coup attempts in different parts of the world, 
including Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Uganda, Chile, Spain, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Argentina, 
Brazil, Algeria and Congo.  In 2011, the last attempted coup took place in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo against Joseph Kabilla.113  
The 20th century has seen three waves of democracy.  These waves came during 
1828–1926, 1943–1962 and the 1970s to the 1980s, each followed by reversals in the 
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form of military coups or the ascendency of the authoritarian regimes.114 I contend that 
democratic transitions or reversals leading to coups result from a variety of reasons: 
Different political culture, legitimacy problems, lack of institutional consolidation or 
civil-military tensions. 
Pakistan is one of the countries that have seen four successful military 
interventions, in 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999. However, it is very important to understand 
Pakistan’s first coup because it set the pattern for subsequent military coups in Pakistan 
and changed the trajectory of civil-military relations in the country.  The Pakistani 
military clearly lies at the center of the country’s politics and economy, and we need to 
understand the initial conditions that led to its entrance in politics.  In order to understand 
the first coup, it is also important to understand how the British maintained civil-military 
relations in the sub-continent, as some of the influencing factors date back to Britain’s 
recruitment policy in the subcontinent, before independence. 
B. BRITISH RECRUITMENT POLICY BEFORE THE INDEPENDENCE OF 
PAKISTAN  
From 1858–1947, the British ran two parallel administrations in India.  The 
commander-in-chief (CNC) of the military and the civilian viceroy were separate in the 
execution of their duties.  Both were directly controlled by London.  After the viceroy, 
the CNC was the second most powerful authority in India and number two in protocol.  
At the operational level, the military and civilian authorities were equal.  After 1833, the 
British placed another senior military advisor/budget officer directly under the civilian 
viceroy in order to assert control over the military budget (see Figure 2).115  All requests 
for funds of military aid and requirements were processed through him.116  Bruneau 
argues that civilian control can only be effective if the institutional set-up works 
effectively and the military budget is monitored in an efficient way.117 
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Figure 2.   British Civil-Military Set-Up of Administration  
before Independence118  
The British maintained effective civilian control over the military through their 
recruitment policy.  The British army was kept professional and away from the influence 
of local politicians because the majority of army troops represented the locals.  The 
British also devised a policy of recruiting more troops from the Muslim minority 
provinces rather than Hindu majority provinces.119 Recruiting troops from minority areas 
had four advantages.  First, the British did not trust a majority of the Hindus after the 
Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 and quit-India movement against the British (1905–1911).120 After 
the mutiny, most of the Indian regiments were re-organized into battalions with a mixture 
of soldiers of diverse cultures.  Second, the Punjab and Frontier regions had favorable 
dispositions toward the army; therefore, the British relied more on these minority areas 
for recruitment. 121 In addition, the people from those areas did not participate in the 
mutiny.  Third, these people were not only loyal but also better warriors: the British 
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earned good will among the majority Punjabi soldiers who, after returning home from 
leave, war or retirement, generally spoke very highly of the British Raj.122    
The recruitment policy adopted by the British had long-term effects on both India 
and Pakistan after their independence.  A strong bond between the Punjabi people and the 
Pakistani military was created.  People held them in great esteem, while the Indian army, 
with a mix of people from various regions, could not develop a strong civil-military 
bond.123 
C. FACTORS THAT SHAPED THE ASCENDENCY OF THE PAKISTANI 
ARMY   
At the time of independence, Pakistan, along with India, inherited British 
institutions. However, because of the way the British Empire was set up, the Pakistani 
state inherited a weak bureaucracy and economy, but an intact military.  It was not only 
professional, but maintained a centralized command, modern values and British 
traditions.  The army leadership was organized, while civilian institutions were very 
fragile, and this imbalance significantly contributed to shaping the state formation 
process in Pakistan.  Rizvi, in The Military State and Society, argues that the military 
stands out as a distinctive institution, in newly emerging states, as being highly 
disciplined and more oriented toward modern technologies, and that it has overwhelming 
control over the instrument of violence.124 The bureaucracy reflects some of these 
characteristics, but the military takes the lead as it is in possession of guns, esprit de 
corps, intercommunication skills and hierarchical values.  The political and civilian 
institutions hardly reflect these values.125  Yet, as mentioned in Chapter I, the logistical 
foundations of the Pakistani army were very weak.  Shuja Nawaz notes that “Pakistan 
army began life with a weak logistical infrastructure and a dependence on the Indian 
good will to transfer assets to Pakistan.”126   
                                                 
 122 Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 33. 
 123 Jalal, 42–45. 
124 Rizvi, The Military and Politics, 20. 
125 Ibid., 20–21. 
126 Shuja, Crossed Swords, 31. 
 35
1. Mission of the Pakistan Army 
The Pakistani defense council first sat in September 1947 to define the mission of 
the Pakistani Military:  to support the civil government and police in maintaining law and 
order and to prevent any tribal incursions.  Its external role was to prevent aggression 
from minor powers and to defend against the major powers.127  It shared 3,250 and 1,320 
border miles with hostile India and Afghanistan, respectively. 128  The 450-mile Kashmir 
border had already been declared a war zone by Pakistan.  Bruneau argues that in order to 
exert effective civilian control, its mission had to be properly defined.129 I contend that, in 
the case of Pakistan, its mission was beyond the capabilities of the Pakistani army as it 
faced multiple challenges soon after partition, which included several problems:  
1) escorting millions of refugees, 2) highly volatile internal and external challenges that 
included an existential threat from India, and 3) Duran Line disputes with Afghanistan.  
The suspicions of the Pakistani leadership soon became reality when India occupied the 
Muslim princely states of Junagadh and Hyderabad; then occupied Goa just a few years 
after independence.130   Then, the Kashmir War of 1948 broke out and emerged as a 
permanent bone of contention between the two countries.  As discussed in Chapter I, 
Pakistan was also facing external threats from Afghanistan.  The internal security 
situation was also far from satisfactory, as mentioned in Chapter I.131  All of these factors 
transformed Pakistan into a state, facing existential threat from its neighbors.  The 
Pakistani leadership, therefore, soon started looking to the United States for military 
training and aid.132  
Under these conditions, the foremost requirement of the leadership of Pakistan 
was to build a formidable defense and a powerful military.  The first speech of Prime 
Minster Liaquat Ali Khan highlighted the importance of a strong army.  Liaquat Ali Khan 
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said, “The defense of the state is our foremost consideration, it dominates all other 
governmental activities.”133 These sentiments were widely shared by the migrated 
refugees from India who settled in major cities afterward, and became a strong political 
voice.  Others who supported the strong army were Kashmiris and religious groups.134  
Thus, during the first eleven years of its independence, and until the first coup, Pakistan 
spent an average of 60.69 percent of its national budget on its defense (Table 1).135 
Table 1.   Defense Expenditure 1947–1958 until Occurrence of the First Coup  





Met from Revenue 
Defense expenditure as 
percentage of Total 
expenditure 
1947-1948 153.8 236.0 65.16 
1948-1950 550 (approx.) 750 (approx.) 72.06 
1950-1952 700 1350 61.00 
1952-1954 700 1400 56.00 
1955-1956 917 1433 64.02 
1956-57 800.9 1330 60.18 
1957-58 854 1521 56.13 
 
Source: Pakistan’s Defense Policy, Pakistan‘s Horizon Vol, 36, No 1 (First Quarter 1983), 32–56 and 
Rizvi, Military, State And Society In Pakistan, 63.  
 
In addition, the U.S. military also continued to provide military aid to Pakistan 
during this period.  The extra burden of defense came at the cost of more economic 
deterioration, joblessness, and law-and-order problems for the newly born state of 
Pakistan, which further alienated the people from the politicians.   It is worth pointing out 
that none of the above mentioned defense expenditures were spent on modernization of 
the defense industry or the research and development activities.  The lack of defense 
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industries made Pakistan more dependent on the West.  In contrast, India focused on self-
indigenization and remained inward looking during this period.136       
Due to the weak political structure of the country, defense and security policies 
were left to the bureaucrats and the top military leadership.  After the formulation of the 
policy, both the military and civil bureaucrats had complete autonomy over the decision-
making process.  Similarly, no checks and balances or measures to implement an 
oversight mechanism of the defense budget were adopted.137   
Although the Pakistani army leadership was professional, it did not have any 
experience with reorganizing its army from scratch.  It was, therefore, decided by Jinnah 
that the British CNC would command and train the Pakistani army leadership and 
reorganize its army for the first four years.138  Administratively, the Pakistani army was 
under the command of the governor general of Pakistan, but operationally, it was under 
the British supreme commander and the viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten.139 The 
British commanders responsible for the defense of Pakistan were highly professional, but 
they had no nationalistic feelings to defend Pakistan.140 As a result, when the Kashmir 
war of 1948 broke out, the British CNC refused to send troops to Kashmir when ordered 
by the governor, Jinnah.141   
I contend that this was the first incident where the army chief was reluctant to 
follow the orders of a democratic civilian leader.  During this period, General Ayub 
Khan, who later became the first Pakistani CNC, was the major general and watched all 
these events closely.142  
By the time Ayub took over command of the Pakistani army in October 1951, it 
had already established itself as the most powerful, central and hierarchical institution, 
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compared to other institutions.  Rizvi argues that, at the time of independence, the 
institutional balance had already been created between the British trained Pakistan army 
and the other weak institutions.143  Ayub Khan had also inherited the same traditions and 
a “superior mindset from the British.”  Rizvi and Finer argue, “The military always 
occupies a distinctive position when new nations emerge.”144 Lack of political and 
institutional control in Pakistan, and dependency on the Pakistani army by the political 
leadership, soon became factors that led to Pakistani military officers, along with some 
civilians, being apprehended while conspiring to plan a coup just a few years after 
independence.  
2. Nationalism and Existential Threats   
Soon after the partition, existential threats to the country, such as in the Kashmir 
War of 1948, the Baluchistan Insurgency, and skirmishes with Afghanistan, brought the 
people and army to one platform.  Finer argues that, in some instances, nationalism drives 
the army to intervene.  For this reason, just four years after the inception of Pakistan, two 
attempts to cause military interventions were foiled.145  The first attempt was staged by 
General Akbar Khan, which became known as the “Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case” 
(1951).  In this coup plot, some of the activists in civil society also played a part, such as 
the poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz, who was an owner of the newspaper, The Pakistan Times.146  
The second conspiracy to stage a coup, by some of the middle ranking officers, was also 
foiled in 1953.  General Akbar, the then divisional commander during the Kashmir War, 
was instrumental in the planning of a coup.  These officers were convinced that civilian 
leadership was incompetent and not capable of retaking Kashmir.  They considered them 
more as patriots and viewed the government as incompetent.  The important thing was 
that military intelligence unearthed the coup.  The officers were court-martialed 
accordingly, and sentenced.147 Rizvi argues that, until this time, the civilians had control 
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exercised control over the Pakistan military, and the military leadership, until this time, 
was loyal to the civilian leadership.148  
This aspect also highlights the fact that, until 1951, the top army leadership 
maintained a professional posture and was not interested in attempting a coup.  Some 
scholars attribute it to the fact that army was not involved in initial coup plots because it 
still adhered to British professional traditions.  While some argue that the army leadership 
thoroughly wanted to discredit the politicians before taking over, I argue that although the 
coup planning was unsuccessful, it did have some effect and influenced the thinking of 
the military leadership.   
In addition, the Pakistani army was also facing serious external threats from 
Afghanistan. Soon after the independence of Pakistan, Afghanistan raised the issue of 
annexing the NWFP province in Afghanistan, followed by a raid on Pakistan in 
September 1950.149  Finer and Siddiqa explain that a country that has a history of wars 
and perceives an existential threat becomes dependent on its army and considers it a 
savior of the state.150 
D. POLITICAL TENSIONS IN THE CIVILIAN SECTOR 
After the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistani politicians found it 
extremely difficult to establish links with the people and Pakistan clearly suffered from 
an incompetent and incapable leadership. In the absence of a constitution, and with a lack 
of unity among politicians, democracy could not really flourish in Pakistan.  The political 
leaders of Pakistan not only failed to create institutions, but they also failed to fulfill the 
basic economic needs of the people.  Ayesha argues that the political process went off the 
rails well before the first military coup in 1958, when Liaquat Ali Khan failed to frame 
the first constitution of Pakistan, until his death four years after the independence of 
Pakistan.151   
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The economic conditions of the country were deteriorating along with the 
political institutions of the country. By late 1951, the national economy had slipped into 
very bad shape.  The value of exports fell by 20 percent and the prices of imports 
escalated to around 40 percent.152  Foreign exchange reserves had dropped to an all-time 
low. Trade policies were framed to benefit a few industrialists while not caring about the 
masses.  The steps taken by the politicians continued to foster the distrust of the people 
due to the poor economic situation, joblessness and poverty. 
1. The Rise of Religious Forces  
Other factors included the rise of regional and parochial forces, political 
corruption and the open defiance of the norms of the parliamentary system.153 Internal 
division among the Muslim League further fragmented the political leaders as they kept 
switching their allegiances to promote their own self-interests.  This vacuum was readily 
filled in by religious parties that succeeded in acting as major pressure groups, despite a 
poor track record in electoral representation. 
In order to assert control over democratic institutions, weak politicians forged 
alliances with religious forces to justify an extremely centralized system of governance, 
in which the economic, political and cultural rights of various ethnic identities in Pakistan 
were denied.154  This policy was to resonate for decades as Pakistan struggled to keep 
itself afloat.  Issues of political authority, culture, language and economic justice gained 
eminence in the post-partition era.  
Religious parties further weakened the already fragile political infrastructure by 
arousing the sentiments of the people to the determent of the minorities.  Finally, 
politicians succumbed to pressure for the first time in the history of Pakistan.  The word 
“ideology” was introduced, in 1953, during Punjab disturbances against a religious 
minority, the Ahmadis.155  In this context, a resolution was passed stating that the 
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ideology of Pakistan would be based on Islam, and no one challenged it.156 The founder 
of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Quaid-e-Azam), never used the phrase “Ideology of 
Pakistan.” The “Two-nation Theory,” for him, was a means to bargain for maximum 
autonomy and the preservation of the social, economic and political rights of the Muslim 
community.  Political leadership was thus forced to bank on the slogan of Islam for the 
unity of the politicians.  This entailed a total deviation from the vision of Jinnah and the 
first step toward radicalizing or undermining the very cause and essence of establishing a 
democratic state.  Several steps that initiated extremist trends were taken to appease 
religious scholars and Ulemas who had decided to play a decisive role in molding the 
newly founded state as a theocracy.  Interestingly, these very Ulemas were opposed to the 
creation of Pakistan on the principle that Islam needed no territorial recognition.  Most of 
them were against partition and criticized Muhammad Ali Jinnah on his efforts for 
Pakistan as being un-Islamic. 157  They were also highly critical of Jinnah and the entire 
Muslim League leadership as being Westernized and un-Islamic.158 However, once 
Pakistan became a reality, they took it upon themselves to take charge of the situation and 
purge the country.159  Interestingly, the religious parties were also divided as to who was 
to lead and who was to follow, as the leaders belonged to different sects.  The three 
religious leaders and groups like Allama Mushriki, Maudidi and Majlis-i-Ahrar (religious 
group) had totally opposite views and divided opinions about the following of Islamic 
principles.160  
A religious leader, Maulana Abul Ala Mawdudi, believed that the creation of 
Pakistan had produced an opportunity for the resurgence of Islam.  He tried to form a 
nexus of religion-minded people who were ardent followers of Islam, to seize power 
using all available means for expanding the influence of Islam.161  
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Finally, the internal division among politicians and religious leaders compelled 
them to look to the army to resolve their differences.  Ayesha Siddiqa argues that this 
vacuum and intrusion is responsible for the present morass, fragmentation of leadership, 
and the ascendency of the army, which took the reins of power into their own hands.162   
2. Ethnic Discrimination 
Most of the ruling elite and feudal lords belonged to West Pakistan.  This 
included the religious leaders as well.  They not only deprived the minorities of their 
rights, but also declared the followers of the Ahmedi sect to be un-Islamic.  In parallel, a 
Cinderella treatment was meted out to the majority Bengali population.  Major resources, 
aid and donations were being diverted to the development of West Pakistan.  The quota in 
civil bureaucracy and the military was only marginal.  Rizvi argues that, until 1967, the 
majority Bengalis represented only 7 percent of the strength of the army.163  These events 
began to antagonize the feelings of the Bengalis.  Jalal argues that the ruling elite of West 
Pakistan missed the pulse of the Bengalis by an arm’s length by not making Bengali one 
of the national languages. Instead, the Urdu language was declared the only official 
language of Pakistan.164 This step sowed another seed of hatred in the Bengali 
population.  The army was used to stamp out the police strike in Bengal; the policemen 
were only agitating against delays in receipt of pay.  Disproportionate use of force by 
politicians in Bengal also angered local Bengalis. An imminent Indian threat was 
projected, however only 2 percent of the army was employed on the borders for the 
defense of East Pakistan.165  A slogan made famous by the politicians and the military 
elite was used during this period:  “The defense of East Pakistan lies in West 
Pakistan.”166   
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The final collapse of the political government began with the emergence of a 
political crisis in East Pakistan in March 1958, when the then chief minister failed to get 
a budget passed and this ended in a tussle between him and the then governor, Fazl ul 
Haq.  It resulted in the removal of the two chief ministers and a governor.167 The 
president had to impose presidential rule in East Pakistan, which lasted for two months 
before the first military intervention of October 1958.   
E. POLITICAL BUREAUCRATIC TENSIONS 
With independence, Pakistan inherited a few highly skilled bureaucrats.  They 
were British trained, experienced, seasoned and efficient.  At the time of British, 
bureaucratic recruitment was throughout India and was competitive, based purely on 
merit: those selected were the best brains of their times.  Due to the deterioration of the 
political institutions, these bureaucrats became the sole drivers of the country’s policies 
and occupied the most important positions in Pakistan’s bureaucracy.  Shuja argues that a 
trio comprised of civilian bureaucrat Iskandar Mirza, the (secretary of defense) and 
Ghulam Muhammad, (the secretary of finance) and the then army chief, General Ayub 
Khan, dominated the state institutions with the help of the Judiciary.168 The two 
bureaucrats were the most senior officers in the Indian civil service at the time of 
independence.  Both were given the opportunity, to dominate civilian institutions due to 
weak political leadership and their internal differences.  
Immediately after the death of Quaid-e-Azam, Khawaja Nazimudin, a prominent 
politician from Bengal, who took over as the governor general, was made prime minster 
after the death of Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, in 1951.169 Ghulam 
Muhammad, from the position of the secretary of finance became the Governor General.  
In parallel, both bureaucrats manipulated the promotion of one of their friends, General 
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Ayub Khan as the commander in chief of the army, by superseding his three seniors.170  
The troika started playing musical chairs with the weak politicians.  
It is worth pointing out that, in the absence of a constitution during that period, 
the governor general was more powerful than the prime minister as he could dissolve the 
cabinet as well as sack the prime minister himself.171  
Justice (retired) Sharif Hussain, who is a prominent author of various law journals 
in Pakistan argues: 
Pakistan might have been a different country today, if some events, which 
changed the course of its history, were averted.  Almost all these events 
are attributable to the conduct and performance of the civil and military 
bureaucracy, the politicians, the landed aristocracy and the superior 
judiciary.172 
In the absence of a weak political infrastructure, most of the bureaucrats transgressed 
their authority and connived with every ruler.  Some of them were Ghulam Muhammad, 
Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Muhammad Ali Bogra and Iskander Mirza, who directly ruled 
the country as head of government and the state.  
The second Prime Minister after Liaquat Ali Khan, Khawaja Nazim was a very 
sincere politician; however, the bureaucracy did not like his way of governance and the 
fact that he represented Bengalis.  Therefore, Ghulam Muhammad dismissed him on 
April 17, 1953.173  Against his dismissal orders, the then speaker of the national 
assembly, Maulvi Tamizuddin, filed a petition in the Sind High Court.  The British 
justice, A.R Cornelius, decided that the governor general exceeded his constitutional 
limits and suspended his dismissal orders.174  The government appealed to the Supreme 
Court.  Justice Muhammad Munir, who was the Chief Justice of Pakistan, suspended the 
orders of the Sind High Court and upheld the orders of the governor general, by evoking 
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a doctrine called the “Law of necessity.”175  This law, passed by the Supreme Court had 
three effects: (1) Both the military and the bureaucracy became the unchallenged king- 
makers of the country, and further cornered the politicians.  This decision became a 
handy tool for subsequent military interventions as well. (3) The bureaucracy and the 
army leadership could rely on the judiciary to further their illegitimate role in the country. 
During this period, the speaker of the national assembly was murdered.  This led 
the Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad, to dissolve the national assembly on October 
25, 1954 and assemble a new cabinet with Muhammad Ali Bogra, (another bureaucrat) as 
the Prime Minister.  Rizvi argues that “had Ghulam Muhammad not enjoyed the support 
of the army, he could not have dismissed the first constituent assembly.”176  Immediately 
after dissolution of the assembly, the army chief, Ayub Khan, was formally inducted into 
the new cabinet as a defense minister, in addition to being army chief.177  I contend that 
Ayub’s elevation was a reward for backing up the bureaucrat turned governor general.  
The dissolution of the assembly further marginalized the politicians and 
strengthened the bureaucratic-military nexus.  The civil bureaucrats, with the backing of 
army, kept changing prime ministers and further discredited the politicians before the 
public.178  
In another significant development, Iskandar Mirza turned into a key player in the 
power game and became the fourth governor general of Pakistan on August 18, 1955 
when Ghulam Muhammad went on sick leave.179  To ensure his confirmation as governor 
general, he dismissed his contender, Muhammad Ali Bogra, and replaced him with 
Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, another bureaucrat, as the fourth prime minister. 180  
During this period, the government came under severe pressure by the majority 
Bengali population to reframe the constitution. Eventually, the constitution was 
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formalized, under pressure from religious parties as well, on 23 March 1956.  It declared 
Pakistan to be an Islamic state with a parliamentary form of the government.  Under this 
new constitution, Iskandar Mirza took over as the first president, while Chaudhry 
Muhammad Ali continued as the prime minister.  
Mirza, instead of acting as a constitutional president, tried to serve as a 
bureaucrat.  This led to differences with the then prime minister, Muhammad Ali, which 
resulted in the sacking of Muhammad Ali, who was replaced by a Bengali politician, Mr. 
Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy on September 12, 1956.  Mr. Suharwardy was a leading 
lawyer and a veteran politician.  He also tried to be independent in pursuit of his foreign 
policy goals.  This again led to the eruption of serious differences between him and the 
president.181  He was made to resign from parliament, without seeking a vote of 
confidence, on October 10, 1957.  After him, Chundrigarh took over as the sixth prime 
minster.  However, he resigned after just two months. 
Lastly, a powerful feudal lord and well-known politician from Punjab, Feroz 
Khan Noon, took over as the seventh prime minister.  He dedicated himself to conducting 
successful general elections in 1959.  The atmosphere became political and there was a 
good likelihood that the Muslim League, under the leadership of Khan Abdul Qayum 
Khan, was gaining popularity in Pakistan.  The brewing of a political climate in the 
country panicked the powerful bureaucracy-military nexus.  In the prevailing 
circumstances, Ayub Khan and Iskandar Mirza pressured Noon to postpone the 
elections.182  The Prime Minster refused to do so.  Meanwhile, he formed his own 
Republican party by mustering some of the deserters of the Muslim League.  Iskandar 
Mirza also sent a secret telegram to the United states, while stating that “the politicians, 
who may come to power after elections were socialists who may endanger the democratic 
process and bring in communism.”   
Shuja argues that with a tacit green light from the United States and army 
leadership he dissolved the assemblies and imposed martial law making General Ayub 
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the chief martial law administrator on October 7, 1958.183  By then, the country had 
already reached the brink of its political crisis.  The ushering in of martial law also closed 
the doors of rule for the civil bureaucracy permanently.  Thus, the first eleven-year period 
in the history of Pakistan was dominated by the civil bureaucracy.  After just nineteen 
days of martial law, Ayub Khan overthrew Iskanadar Mirza on October 27, 1958 and sent 
him into exile in England.  During the first eleven years of independence, seven prime 
ministers and eight cabinets had been changed.   
F. POLITICAL MILITARY TENSIONS    
Another factor that contributed to the politicization of the army and improved its 
confidence was when the government asked it to run the internal administration of the 
country, immediately after independence.  The weak civilian institutions were unable to 
control the internal and external threats to the country as it lacked basic resources, a work 
force and an industrial set-up.  An internal crisis arose when the Khan of Kalat from 
Baluchistan refused to join Pakistan.  The army was subsequently sent to quell the 
rebellion.  Serra argues that, in order to demonstrate effective civilian control, the army 
had to be kept away from the civilian sectors of administration.184  The civilians did 
otherwise in Pakistan.  In 1948, anti-police riots in Bangladesh, in 1951 (Balouch 
Insurgency) and 1953 (anti Ahmedi Riots), the army was extensively used to suppress 
riots.  Martial law was imposed in major cities of Punjab.  Successful army actions on the 
internal front had two effects: (1) improvement of the army’s confidence that it could 
handle civil affairs better than the civilians; (2) it started viewing civilian leadership as 
incompetent and unable to run its affairs.185 The army was involved, by order of the 
politicians, to assist civilians, also.   The army remained widely involved in resolving the 
socio-economic problems of the people as well.  It undertook massive relief operations in 
cyclone-affected areas while providing food and shelter.  Army engineers restored means 
of transport, including repairs to bridges, railway and telephone networks. In 1951, 1952 
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and 1954, the army remained involved in an anti-locust drive, which saved standing 
crops, and conducted anti-salinity and water logging operations successfully in Sindh.186  
I contend that these factors were sufficient for the people to consider army leadership as 
their role model, compared to the weak politicians.  Shuja argues that Ayub Khan, after 
seeing political decay, started thinking about creating an office of supreme commander of 
the armed forces, with himself as a supreme commander and ex-officio member of a 
cabinet with a view to stop the interference of politicians in the internal affairs of the 
country.187  Shuja, while quoting an Ayub memoir, points out that Ghulam Muhammad, 
who was the prime minister in 1953, offered Ayub Khan the opportunity to take over the 
country, but Ayub declined.188   
I contend that Ayub did not take over at this stage because he was still 
maintaining the professional values of the British.  However, some argue that the army 
did not take over in 1953 because the army leadership wanted to see a complete collapse 
of the political infrastructure and wanted to discredit the politicians before publicly taking 
over. 
The influence of military leadership in the affairs of state further increased during 
the period of President Mirza because of his personal friendship with General Ayub.  
Also, Mirza’s previous military background, as well his close ties as secretary of defense 
with the military, played a part.189   
As evidence, when the military was employed in an anti-smuggling drive in East 
Pakistan, some of the politicians, who were backing the smugglers, tried to exert 
influence over army leadership through the prime minister to curtail the anti-smuggling 
operations.  The army chief, in turn, told the president to stop the prime minister from 
interfering in the army’s operations.  Subsequently, the president ordered Prime Minster 
Noon, not to interfere in the army’s anti-smuggling drive.190  
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The above evidence suggests that by the mid-fifties (three years before the first 
coup), the army had been heavily politicized and the army chief had become a key player 
in the decision-making processes of the country, not only in defense, but in foreign affairs 
also, as the bureaucrats-turned-politicians were no match for the powerful military.  In 
1956, the tenure of the army chief, General Ayub, was extended to another term of five 
years.191  By this time, Mirza had realized his mistake of concentrating a disproportionate 
amount of power to Ayub, but Shuja argues that by then, it was too late for the president 
to remove Ayub.   
During this period, the mistrust between Ayub and the president had also grown, 
as Ayub started bypassing the president in all dealings with the Americans.192  Shuja 
argues that while quoting U.S. consular, General Frisk, that by March 1957, some of the 
army generals had openly started saying that “they would not employ such low characters 
as politicians even as clerks.” 193  Finer called this a sense of syndicalism and a national 
interest, when the military begins to draw their own notions and judgment as to what is 
right or wrong for a nation.  They also consider themselves as guardian of the state.194  
G. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE AND MILITARY AID  
I contend that one of the factors that influenced the army to intervene was its 
interaction with developed countries.  Soon after the partition, the military leadership 
started looking toward developed military powers to seek training to thwart external 
threats.195  Due to unfriendly neighbors and emerging war rhetoric with India on the 
Kashmir issue, the civilian leadership also felt the need to procure new equipment and 
modernize its military as per Western training standards.  Finer and Rizvi argue that “the 
military has learned to use modern skills on par with modern armies.”196 Soon Ayub 
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Khan established contacts with the United States while bypassing the weak civilian 
leadership.197  I contend that, in a fragmented and backward society like Pakistan, the 
army leadership established itself as a role model and maintained a distinct identity.  
Rizvi, in The Military State and Society argues, “an institutional imbalance was created 
between the Pakistan army and other institutions because of continued interaction of the 
Pakistani army with the West.”198 Rizvi also points out that: 
The interaction of the Pakistani military with the West channeled ideas 
and doctrines from abroad which had implications for domestic and social-
political and security affairs.  These social changes enabled Ayub Khan to 
evaluate the Pakistani society in terms of backwardness.199   
Siddiqa argues that “the tacit support from the West ultimately translated into 
institutional imbalance and the rise of the political strength of the military.  This aspect 
also bolstered the image of the military and the society and civilian institutions.”200 I 
argue that the Indian army officers did not form any treaty and peace accords with the 
West.  They remained part of the same culture and society, thus a vacuum did not 
develop between Indian society and the army.  SEATO and CENTO membership also 
gave immense exposure to Pakistani army officers.  This fact has been acknowledged by 
Pakistani as well as Indian scholars.201 I have deduced that if there is much of an 
intellectual vacuum between the civil and military leadership, it unbalances the 
equilibrium and provides an opportunity for the military to intervene.  During this period, 
the decay and fragmentation of political institutions could be seen, which was in sharp 
contrast to the emerging modern military leadership that had further honed its skills by 
interacting with modern countries and technological advancements.202  
One of the factors that improved the confidence of military leadership to incite a 
coup was the favorable attitude of United States towards military leadership.  During the 
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period of the cold war, the United States was desperately looking for staunch allies in 
South Asia in the neighborhood of the Soviet Union and China in order to counter 
communism and socialism.  The United States’ inclination toward Pakistan was based on 
four main points: Pakistan’s proximity to the Soviet Union, which could offer the United 
States opportunities to watch Soviet moves; the country’s proximity to the Persian Gulf 
(which could enable Pakistan to defend vital sea transportation routes for oil to the U.S.); 
the ideological closeness of Pakistan to countries of the Middle East and the comradeship 
of Pakistan with China, which could help the United States befriend China.203 America’s 
leadership was also eying the deteriorating political situation in Pakistan.  It saw its best 
alternative in Ayub Khan, as he was pro-West, modern and a charismatic leader.  During 
that period, Pakistan-U.S. relations could be seen more in terms of inter-military relations 
than in terms of civilian-civilian relations.  Shuja argues that “the U.S. noted that the 
army was the only institution free from rivalries and was identified as most suitable to 
serve U.S. interests.”204 
H. THE ARMY’S PRESTIGE   
The Pakistani military was not only professional; it was also hierarchical and 
maintained a distinct identity by remaining away from society.  Finer argues that the 
army takes a distinct shape because of its unique culture, corporate identity and 
cohesiveness. While comparatively staying away from public, their public image 
remained high.205  Successful results obtained by the Pakistani army in the 1948 Kashmir 
War further broadened the image of the army before the public.  Rizvi explains that Ayub 
Khan’s thinking started to change in 1954 when the former Prime Minister (Ghulam 
Muhammad) offered him, the job of taking over the administration of the country.206’   
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The decay in political leadership and civilian Institutions led Ayub to believe that 
it was in the nation’s best interest that he should save the country from corrupt politicians 
and bureaucrats.  Finer has deliberated on this problem of national interest in depth and 
he argues that this belief stems from a unique mission in a society and awareness of its 
self-sacrificial values.  The military in Pakistan also considers itself a servant of the state 
and not of the politicians.  Finer argues that this was the driving force of the coups in 
many countries.  I contend that Ayub Khan also began to think himself as the servant of 
the state and not the politicians, which later inclined him to affecting the military coup.207   
I. FINAL COLLAPSE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP  
The final collapse of the political government began with the emergence of the 
political crisis in East Pakistan, in March 1958, when the chief minister failed to get a 
budget passed, and this ended in a tussle between him and the governor, Fazlul Haq.  
This resulted in the removal of the two chief ministers and a governor by the president.208  
The president had to impose presidential rule in East Pakistan, which lasted two months.  
Meanwhile, in West Pakistan, President, Iskandar Mirza, also imposed martial law as the 
political situation was out of control.  This was the last nail in Mirza’s coffin.  Rizvi 
explains that, by 1958, the corruption, black marketing, the shortage of food and 
joblessness forced the people out of their homes.209 The government treasury was empty 
and foreign exchange reserves had shrunk to 240 million rupees.210  There was 
widespread industrial unrest and labor unions struck.  The impotent leadership failed to 
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general perception among the people on the coup was that only the army could bring 
back prosperity and peace.”211 Wheras Rizvi argues, “there was a feeling of relief among 
the general public.”212  
Ayub Khan was also heard to say, on many occasions, that the political leadership 
was inept and unable to run the affairs of the country.213  This is what has been termed by 
Finer when the military assumes itself as guardian of the state.214  There are two instances 
before the actual military intervention where Ayub was getting poised to overthrow the 
government.  He toured both East and West Pakistan extensively in 1957 and gave the 
people first-hand information and apprised the political leaders about the deteriorating 
political situation.215  He was quoted as saying that “if people want me then I will not 
shirk my duty.”216  
J. OCCASION, DISPOSITION, MOOD, AND OPPORTUNITY  
Finer explains that that the military intervenes when it has mood, opportunity and 
disposition.217 This is what finally happened in Pakistan as the political parties provided 
the Pakistani military the opportunity, occasion and disposition to intervene.  Ayub Khan 
was also inspired by the geo-political changes going on around the world as mentioned 
earlier.  Rizvi and Finer argue that various instances of coup around the world also 
influenced the military leadership (coup in Egypt 1952, Iraq and Burma 1958).218  The 
political deadlock, weak economy, support of the people and judiciary provided the 
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military the occasion, opportunity and disposition to intervene.  The imposition of martial 
law was the last nail in the coffin of the then president by again inviting the army to take 
over control of the country.   
Bruneau and Scott Tollesfson argue that tension may arise when the military is 
compelled to rescue society from corrupt politicians.219  Later, General Ayub sentenced 
more than 200 civil bureaucrats for corruption charges after initiating the military coup.  
The military took over from the president, without any violence or bloodshed.  The 
Supreme Court legitimized the military coup while declaring that military coups are a 
natural phenomenon and a routine matter in different parts of the world, while citing 
examples of all around coups.   
My general findings of the first coup, as also shown in Figure 3, are:  
• Weak political institutions and corrupt politicians who had no grass-root 
level support. 
• Lack of institutional control and delay in formation of constitution. 
• Powerful and professional army, brimming with the sense of nationalism, 
corporate interests. 
• Involvement in internal security and administrative duties that could 
otherwise have been resolved politically. 
• Internal and external threats and the clean and incorrupt army that 
emerged as a savior of the state. 
• The Punjabi army had roots amongst the people. 
• External influence and modern education created a divide between the less 
educated society and the modern army. 
• Effect of influence on all-around coups in the world. 
• Development of Bureaucracy-military nexus. 
• Finally, occasion, opportunity, disposition and mood. 
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Figure 3.   Causes of The First Coup in Pakistan 
K. CONCLUSION  
This chapter examines the various reasons for the cause of the first military coup 
in Pakistan.  In order to understand the reasons for the first coup, this chapter looked at 
the emergence of the civil military relations in the Indo-Pak sub-continent at the time of 
the British. The British had devised an effective civilian control over the military 
because: (1) Military authorities were dependent on the civilian viceroy for its budget 
requirement,  (2) The army was kept professional by insulating it from the influence of 
the local politicians, (3) Recruiting more troops more from minority areas, like Punjab, as 
they were better warriors, and (4) The British devised policies where it generated a good 
will among the locals (recruitment areas) by offering more perks and privileges to 
Military-Bureaucracy 
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soldiers.  This resulted in the creation of a strong military bond between the people of 
Punjab and the army.  Most of the recruitment areas later formed part of Pakistan in 1947. 
I contend that after partition, the Pakistan military was already professional and 
had inherited British traditions and professionalism.  On the other hand, the political 
leadership who had advocated for the cause of Pakistan had no roots among the people.  
Pakistan’s problems were compounded when its leadership died soon after partition, thus 
leaving a vacuum in the country.  In the absence of a constitution, democracy could not 
really flourish as post-independence Pakistan had only one political party, i.e., the 
Muslim League.  This created a vacuum readily filled by religious parties that succeeded 
in acting as a major pressure group, despite a poor track record in electoral 
representation.  These events further collapsed the political institutions. 
Issues of political authority, culture, language and economic justice gained 
eminence in the post-partition era.  A decay in political institutions led to the rise of a 
strong bureaucracy and the army nexus, which further damaged the political institutions.  
The bureaucrats replaced seven prime ministers and eight constitutions, which further 
discredited the politicians before the public. These events further damaged the civilian 
institutions, while the Pakistan army continued to rise in power and authority, because 
Pakistan was mired in internal and external problems after partition.  It faced existential 
threats from both India and Afghanistan, and internally, its two provinces were facing 
insurgency.  Pakistan, in a quest for survival, military aid and training formed alliances 
with the United States.  The regular interaction of a weak army with a modern Western 
state made its leadership a modern thinker, while the society remained backward and 
illiterate. In India, the army mirrored society. 
I contend that the first coup in Pakistan was caused by weak political institutions 
and divided politicians who had no grass roots level support.  A lack of institutional 
control and a delay in the formation of a constitution, plus a powerful and professional 
army brimming with a sense of nationalism, also contributed to the coup.  Other factors 
include: syndicalism, patriotism and corporate interest, internal security and 
administrative duties that could otherwise have been resolved politically, and internal and 
external threats along with a clean and non-corrupt army that presented itself as a savior 
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of the state.  External influences and modern education caused a division between the less 
educated society and the modern army. Also, occasion, opportunity, disposition, and a 
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III. MILITARY RULE (1958–1969) AND CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
The authoritarian regime of Ayub Khan’s from 1958–1969 led to further 
weakening of the democratic institutions, laying the groundwork for the second military 
coup Ayub’s policies.  During this period, the country also saw rapid economic growth, 
which ultimately brought income inequalities due to lack of effective redistributive 
policies that gave rise to regional and intraregional disparities.  These disparities led to 
the emergence of anti-military socioeconomic forces, which were exploited by political 
forces, due to a lack of representative institutional building.  Specifically, this chapter 
explains Ayub’s treatment of the Bengalis, opposition parties and civilians that led to 
civilian strife.  Finally, this chapter explains Ayub’s downfall because of his authoritarian 
policies and non-adoption of a representative political culture.   
In expounding upon the history of Ayub’s regime and policies and then eventually 
his downfall, I illustrate here that various factors play a role in regime formation and 
regime downfall. 
Ayub restored the confidence of the people by immediately addressing the root 
causes of economic mismanagement and corrupt practices by civil bureaucrats.  He 
managed to bring corruption under control by adopting good administrative techniques.  
Isharat argues that the strength of Ayub’s success can mostly be attributed to good 
administrative techniques, adoption of the right strategies and consistent formulation of 
economic policies.220 These steps also brought the prices of basic commodities under 
control.  General Ayub successfully brought the sagging economy of Pakistan out of 
crisis.  However, his economic policies generally favored the urban population and 
focused on benefitting the upper middle class and a private sector in the West, while 
creating regional and intra-regional economic disparities within Pakistan. The biggest 
impact was felt by the Bengalis and the non-Punjabi rural class.  
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A. TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES 
The ultimate beneficiaries of Ayub’s industrial policies were targeted people from 
the private sector and the urban and industrial classes, whereas  low-level industrial 
workers were further deprived and saw their salaries lowered.  Ayub introduced 
revolutionary measures in the industrial sector, which included policies like trade 
liberalization and import and export incentives while taking maximum advantage of 
foreign aid.  During Ayub’s period, Pakistan became one of the fastest growing nations in 
Asia, with growth at 7 percent.  Pakistan’s industry grew by 72 percent, compared with 
55 percent as the average industrial growth rate of Asian countries.221  His period, prior to 
the 1965 War, saw a 17 percent rise in the manufacturing sector.222  However, the wages 
of industrial workers dropped 12 percent between 1954 and 1967.223  
During this growth period, the state diverted income from agriculture resources to 
the industrial sector, which created rapid growth in the urban sector.  This would have 
been an effective policy if the benefits had been distributed in rural areas as well as 
across the country; however, that was not implemented. Earnings from jute, especially 
from East Pakistan were also spent on the industrialization of the urban West, which later 
became a symbol of regional exploitation.224  At the same time migration into the urban 
sector limited because of the geographical differences.  Before the period of Ayub Khan, 
the difference in per capita income between East and West Pakistan was 30 percent. 
However, at the end of Ayub’s era (1969), the difference had grown to 61 percent.225 The 
rapid industrial growth during Ayub’s period gave rise to two factors:  regionalism and 
class inequalities.226 Ian Talbot argues that between 1961and 1967, only 22 percent of the 
loans taken from the Pakistan Investment and Industrial Corporation were diverted to 
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East Pakistan, while the rest were spent in West Pakistan.227 Ayub’s policies brought not 
only inter-wing economic disparities but intra-provincial trade policies in line with 
Western countries that facilitated rapid industrialization of the country.  Large-scale 
manufacturing grew at the faster pace of approximately 23.6 percent per annum in 
between 1949 and 1954, and continued to maintain an impressive growth rate during the 
first half of 1960.  The annual growth rate during this period was as follows: wing 
disparities, as well as a major chunk of development, were utilized in urban Punjab.228  
However, during Ayub’s regime, Pakistan adopted trade policies in line with the 
policies of the Western countries that facilitated the rapid industrialization of the country.  
Large-scale manufacturing grew at faster pace of 23.6 percent per annum in between 
1949–1954, and continued to maintain impressive growth rate during first half of 1960 
also. The annual growth rate during the period, as shown in Table 2, was as follows: 
Table 2.   Annual Growth Rates of Various Sectors of Economy  
(Percent per Annum) 
Year  Agriculture Manufacturing- 
Large and Small 
Services Banking Public 
Admin 
GDP 
1958–59 4.0 5.6 and 2.3 4.0 12.9 9.8 5.5 
1959–60 0.3 2.7 and 2.3 3.8 22.1 -2.7 0.9 
1960–61 -0.2 20.3 and 2.9 4.7 10 1.3 4.9 
1961–62 6.2 19.9 and 2.9 4.0 8.5 3.9 6.0 
1962–63 5.2 15.7 and 2.9 4.2 11.5 2.8 7.2 
1963–64 2.5 15.5 and 2.9 4.0 8.9 9.7 6.5 
1964–65 5.2 13.0 and 2.9 7.0 37.9 17.8 9.4 
1958–1964 3.0 13.3 and 2.7 4.1 12.3 4.1 5.2 
 
Source: Wiggins and the Government of Pakistan Economic Survey, 1984–85229 
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Ayub’s industrial policy was based upon trade liberalization, which included 
import and export bonus schemes.  He further liberalized trade by extending the benefits 
of the Open General License (OGL) scheme, which encouraged the participation of new 
traders.  Import duty on heavy industrial machinery was kept minimal.  Ayub also placed 
a number of items on the free import list, which continued to encourage investors.  
However, foreign investment in the industrial sector remained minimal. 
Omar argues that the liberalization of the economy under Ayub Khan was “not a 
neo-classical paradise that it appeared to be.”230 The industrial program was, instead, a 
product of profit incentives created by government distortions as a response to price 
signals originating in market transactions.  The protection of local industries from foreign 
competition led to the protectionism of local industries as well, luring the private class 
into industrial investment.  However, the lack of checks and balances on implementation 
partly resulted in the addition of inefficient industrial units, which were primarily kept 
operational for want of subsidies.  Omar, while citing Soligo and Stern, argues that out of 
forty-four industries, the values of twenty-three of the industrial units was negative and 
the value of input was more than the output of these units.231  The dollar was artificially 
kept high, which encouraged imports while discouraging exports.  This policy put undue 
strains on export-oriented agricultural commodities, which affected the rural and 
manufacturing classes. 
Osama and Akbar Zaidi, while quoting studies of the Asian Development Bank, 
argue that the liberal import policy could not have taken place without the inflow of aid 
during the period.232 Foreign aid from the 1950s to first half of 1960 increased from 2.65 
percent to 7 percent of the GNP.233 Gustav Papanek, in Pakistan’s Development: Social 
Goals and Private Incentives argues that foreign aid significantly contributed to 
strengthening the economy of Pakistan during Ayub’s period.  Inflation was kept in 
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complete check (around 3 percent during the 1960s).234 Pakistan reached a budget surplus 
for the first time in its history during Ayub’s era.  Overall, the GNP and per capita 
incomes hovered between 6.7 percent and 3.8 percent, respectively.235 These measures 
gave rise to a new class of small industrialists who hailed from the middle-urban class 
and failed to create investment opportunities for people from urban and Tehsil (small 
cities) areas.  The twenty-two families who benefitted immensely from the industrial 
revolution emerged as the richest families in Pakistan. 236 They owned 66 percent of the 
industries, 97 percent of insurance and 80 percent of the banks.237  The direct 
beneficiaries of his policies were a few elite and people from the urban middle class, such 
as military officers and bureaucrats who were given lucrative appointments in the public 
and private sectors as a result of the economic boom.  Ayub’s son was one of the indirect 
beneficiaries of the industrial revolution.  He benefitted because his industrialist father-
in-law was given extra concessions, which resulted in the growth of his industrial empire.   
On the other hand, Ayub’s regime neglected the welfare of the common man as 
developmental projects were engineered only to benefit a special class.  Little attention 
was paid to the provisioning of social services, including the education sector.  The 
population growth rose from 2.3 percent to 2.8 percent during his period, and this led to a 
further decline of living standards, in general.  He further imposed a ban on the trade 
unions and, as mentioned earlier, the wages of the industrial workers went down 12 
percent under Ayub’s government.  His policy makers were under the impression that 
lowering wages and imposing a ban on trade unions would facilitate an economic take-
off.  However, what they neglected to do was control prices for wage workers, who saw a 
reduction in income. Since Ayub’s economic developments were mainly focused in urban 
areas, some of the population of rural areas shifted to urban areas in quest of better 
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fortunes. These changes began to directly affect the common person.238 The rapid 
urbanization, with no planning on government’s part, lead to cost increases in the housing 
sectors, again affecting low-wage workers and further deterioration in basic health care 
facilities.239   
Ayub’s unequal economic policies thus created a large vacuum between the rich 
and the poor, which gave rise to socio-economic tensions in the country.  Over time, 
these economic frustrations increased among the working class and later played a 
contributory role towards the fall of Ayub’s regime, manifesting as street protests and 
leading to the second military intervention.240   
B. THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR 
Ayub Khan was highly inspired by the European industrial revolution.  For this 
reason, his policy makers channeled the agriculture resources of West and East Pakistan 
towards the industrial sector. His overall polices resulted in luring rural farmers to invest 
their export- oriented agricultural savings to the industrial sector. However, only 15 to 37 
percent bore fruitful results, while 65 to 85 percent of the agriculture investments went to 
waste due to higher consumption in the rich urban class.241 His widely trumpeted land 
reforms act also proved to be only cosmetic in nature because efforts at land reforms 
were not only half-hearted, but also lacked implementation, partly due to the influence of 
the land elite over the civil bureaucracy.242  Overall, Ayub’s agriculture reforms could not 
improve the living conditions of the rural population.  Thus, the socio-economic divide 
continued to grow among the masses despite the fact that Ayub brought revolutionary 
changes in the agriculture sector.  
When Ayub took over, the agriculture sector was the biggest sufferer.  The rate of 
growth in this sector, until 1958, was a meager 1.43 percent per annum, even falling 
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behind the population growth, which was 2.4 percent.243 Ayub Khan recognized the 
importance of the agriculture sector as more than 80 percent of the Pakistani population 
was associated with agriculture and lived in rural areas.  Modern irrigation techniques 
were used and as well as the term “Green Revolution.” During the first stage, dams were 
built and the flow of water to all non-irrigable areas was channelized.  Consolidation of 
holdings and stern measures against hoarding were combined with rural credit and work 
programs.244 In the second stage, modern fertilizers and tube wells were provided at 
subsidized rates to farmers.  His policies in the agriculture sector led to a 3.7 percent 
increase in its growth in the late 50s.  Later, in the 60s, agricultural growth rose to 6.3 
percent per annum.245  Wheat production saw a rise of 91 percent; rice and sugar output 
increased by 147 percent.  He made effective use of aid from the United States.  U.S. 
food supplies were provided to meet shortages, under U.S. public law PL 480.  The 
United States aid also helped keep commodity prices down.246 A landmark pact on water 
management, known as the Indus Water Treaty, was formalized with India.  On the 
whole, Pakistan displayed very impressive economic progress during a period when other 
countries, like Korea and Taiwan, were struggling to catch up.  Wriggins argues that 
Pakistan made excellent use of the World Bank and other donors’ consortiums.  These 
steps built up donors’ confidence to further the loan by increasing its GNP.247  
Under the land reforms act, Ayub’s government distributed 2.5 million acres of 
land to landless farmers by usurping landlords with large holdings.248 In 1959, the land 
reforms ceiling had been fixed to 500 acres irrigated and 1,000 acres of un-irrigated 
land.249 The ceiling was, however, fixed in terms of individual instead of family holdings.  
Omar argues that barely 35 percent of the surrendered land came into use, while the rest 
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of it remained uncultivable.250  Overall, the Punjabi rural feudal and elite were not 
affected by land-reform policies as they were given due compensation for uncultivable 
land.  Ayub’s administrative machinery, therefore, failed to implement land reforms act.  
I contend that Ayub’s land reforms act was not successful due to failing in 
implementation part.   
Heavy investment and the construction of dams, roads and new cities also created 
a big job market for the labor force and transportation industry.  Ayub Khan’s economic 
policies significantly changed the political climate of the country   Morale and the 
opinion of the performance of civil servants improved significantly with the improvement 
of the country’s economy.  Overall, retired bureaucrats and military officers were the 
main beneficiaries, while ignoring the low income group employees’ class.251  As a 
result, one of the instrumental roles of Ayub’s downfall was played out by the street 
power of the masses, which was mainly comprised of the low-income class and industrial 
workers.252   
In economic and political terms, the 1965 War proved disastrous for Pakistan’s 
economy and the image of Ayub Khan.  The war had two effects: it not only stopped U.S. 
aid to Pakistan, but foreign investments were reduced by 25 percent. 253  Shuja argues that 
Pakistan spent 7.6 billion rupees (U.S. 1.6 billion) of its military’s takeover on defense 
alone.254 The lack of democratic institutions and a power base in the hands of one 
authoritarian ruler led Ayub into making the wrong policy decision regarding going to 
war when the country was struggling economically. 
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C. THE DOWNFALL OF THE REGIME 
Interestingly, some scholars attribute Ayub’s downfall to the country’s economic 
boom.  His economic policies mostly resulted in the unequal distribution of wealth 
between certain privileged classes and the common person.  With the growth of the 
economy, a vacuum of income between the inter-regional, inter-personal, rich and poor 
classes grew. A gap between the majority people of East Pakistan and West Pakistan was 
clearly visible.  Most of the development related to work and donor funding were utilized 
in the West.255  
Omar argues that the lack of concern over distributional issues proved to be 
“Achilles heels for the Ayub’s regime.”256 The revolt against Ayub Khan was brought 
about because of conflict between the regional disparities and the class inequalities. 
Wriggins, in “The Rulers Imperatives,” argues that economic development in Pakistan 
gave rise to socio-economic forces that disturbed the equilibrium in society and gave rise 
to political, social and economic tensions in the country. There were no institutions in the 
country to balance out these socio-economic and political forces because of the lack of 
institutions. 257 Bhutto further fueled the sentiments of these deprived people and 
successfully transformed these groups into a political force by encouraging the people 
into the streets, which virtually crippled the state’s machinery due to the numerous strikes 
and protests.  Most of these violent protestors were students, industrial workers, clerks 
and lawyers.  In March 1969, a workers’ strike totally crippled the industrialist capital, 
Karachi, which had 40 percent of the industries of Pakistan.258 
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The opposition parties, which were kept away from the democratic process, 
joined the street protests later.259 I argue that the lack of democratic consolidation, 
dysfunctional civil institutions and the concentration of power within Ayub Khan as well 
as the rise of socio-economic tensions led to the emergence of the socio-economic forces, 
which became one of the reasons for his downfall.   
D. AYUB KHAN AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 
When Ayub came to power, there were two political parties in East Pakistan, the 
Awami League and the Krishak Sramik (peasants and workers).260 However, like the 
politicians of West Pakistan, the politicians of East Pakistan were divided and engaged in 
bitter political bickering and squabbling to the extent that the speaker of the provincial 
assembly was killed and the deputy speaker was seriously injured.  Therefore, the people 
of East Pakistan initially welcomed Ayub, thinking that army leadership was 
incorruptible, upright and would perform better than corrupt politicians and change the 
fortune of the Bengalis.261  
Nonetheless, Ayub was a disappointment to the Bengalis.  His constitutional 
changes in 1962 deprived the Bengalis from participating in decision making on both 
political and socio-economic matters. Choudhury argues that under Ayub’s policies, “the 
Bengalis could only react but could not act.”262  
Further, his economic policies widened the gulf between East and West Pakistan 
as all development was directed toward West Pakistan, ignoring East Pakistan.  The 
major utilization of foreign aid and developmental infrastructure, including the building 
of a new capital and industrialization were directed towards benefitting the people of 
West Pakistan.  Shuja argues that 75 percent of the aid and resources were spent in West 
Pakistan during this period.   
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Ayub continued to spend more resources in West Pakistan, while marginalizing 
the Bengalis, which fuelled the sentiments of the Bengalis.  After the 1965 War, East 
Pakistan suffered heavily, in economic terms, as the annual growth rate in East Pakistan 
declined to 4 percent, whereas the growth rate in the West remained around 6.4 percent 
until 1968.263 Wriggins argues that “Bengali civil servants, whose representation was 
already marginal in the civil services, felt they were getting short shrift in a service where 
they were poorly represented at higher levels.”264 Ian Talbot argues that the Bengali 
majority population had been marginalized since independence over language and other 
issues.  However, the policies of Ayub Khan further fuelled the Bengalis sentiments as 
the bureaucratic military felt threatened by political participation and the decentralization 
of power, which might have closed the chapters for any future political role by the West 
Pakistani elite and the Punjabi-dominated military.265 This further exacerbated the 
differences between the economies of the two wings of Pakistan.  The per capita income 
and the ratio of the strength of the military between East and West were, subsequently, 
36.4 percent and 45.6 percent and 149 (Bengalis) to 894 (West Pakistanis), 
respectively.266   
Cohen argues that the representation of Bengalis in East Pakistan had been lower 
since the British period as the Bengalis were not inclined toward joining the army.  Also, 
they were marginalized after the mutiny since the mutiny was launched by the Bengal-
based army.  Therefore, the representation of Bengalis in the military remained low under 
the British period.  He also argues that the British did not develop any infrastructure in 
Bengal because of its geographic location, which was more inhospitable, and was 
unproductive for investors due to the high density of severe cyclonic conditions and its 
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excessive poverty level.267  Cohen argues that some of the concerns regarding the 
diversion of all developmental and East Pakistan resources toward West Pakistan were 
therefore, slightly exaggerated. 
During the seventeen days of the 1965 War, East Pakistan was left to defend itself 
in economic as well defense matters.  The West Pakistani regime only provided one 
infantry division and some skeleton units of air force and navy to defend the large 
territory of East Pakistan.268  For this reason, West Pakistanis firmly believed that the 
“defense of East lay in West.” I contend that it was a wrong myth based upon an 
unrealistic hypothesis.  The undefended East Pakistan, during the War of 1965, also 
strengthened the Bengali belief that West Pakistan did not care about their defense.  
Talbot argues that the 1965 War proved a turning point toward charging the anti-West 
Pakistan sentiments of Bengalis as it underscored the geographic isolation and 
vulnerability of the eastern wing.269   
Further, some undesired results of the 1965 War also destroyed the myth that the 
powerful Punjabi martial West Pakistan army could defeat India easily.270 I contend that 
the 1965 War results also emboldened the Bengalis to step up their demands for more 
autonomy and more power.  In 1968, the seeds of friction and hatred grew further 
between the East and West Pakistanis when a leader of the Awami National Party, Shiekh 
Mujib, was implicated and put behind bars in the famous “Agartala Conspiracy Case.” A 
few authors, like Qutbudin Aziz, point fingers at India, which has never accepted the 
creation of Pakistan, as instrumental in hatching an Agartala conspiracy with the help of 
Shiekh Mujib and some Bengali military officers, with a view to liberate East Pakistan.271 
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E. AYUB AND THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP   
This part explains that one of the contributory causes of the fall of Ayub’s regime 
was the lack of institutional building, an intolerant attitude toward political opponents 
and lack of political culture.  Ayub’s fall occurred for three reasons: 1) lack of adoption 
of political culture as he failed to consolidate the democratic institutions, 2) unexpected 
results from the 1965 War and the signing of the Tashkent cease-fire agreement with 
India, 3) the unequal distribution of income that gave rise to class differences in the 
country and was successfully exploited by the politicians who were marginalized by 
Ayub during the eleven years of his authoritarian rule. 
Ayub, who was an authoritarian ruler, suppressed the opposition by making wide 
use of state machinery and intelligence agencies.  Immediately after taking over, he 
targeted civil bureaucrats and punished them for corruption, malpractices and 
inefficiency.  In order to bring democratic reforms under pressure from the U.S. 
government, Ayub Khan introduced a concept of electoral participation, known as the 
Basic Democracies System (BD), which was a multi-layered political process in which 
the chosen representatives were elected at a grass roots level.272  The BD system, despite 
its weaknesses, had one major advantage.  It became instrumental in creating a political 
culture in Pakistan that eventually caused the resignation of Ayub due to a mass 
mobilization of the people.   
The BD system also resulted in communication between local government and 
central government while bypassing the provincial political system.  Each tier was given 
certain responsibilities that varied from local administration, agriculture and addressing 
the problems of the local community.273  It mobilized public opinion, generated a 
political will and encouraged the people’s participation.  The BD system also brought 
Ayub closer to the people.  Many social scientists, like Wriggens, have praised the BD 
system adopted by Ayub Khan.274  However, BD members remained dependent on 
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bureaucrats for their funds and for the resolution of their internal disputes.  The 
bureaucrats were firmly controlled by the central government; thus, in turn; the BD 
members remained loyal and subservient to Ayub.  These BD members remained a 
political instrument to further Ayub’s policies and cast votes in favor of Ayub Khan 
during the 1966 elections, thereby defeating Fatima Jinnah.  The media remained under 
the strict control of the government.  A leading newspaper, The Pakistan Times, was 
banned and later nationalized by the government.  Thus, Ayub Khan exercised tight 
control over the people through a centralized administrative infrastructure. 
Ayub was an authoritarian leader who did not allow the nurturing of political 
institutions.  He came down hard on politicians by introducing a “Public Representative 
Office Disqualification Act (PRODA),” which rendered them unable to hold public office 
for fifteen years, if found guilty.275 Another ordinance, the Elective Bodies 
Disqualification Order (EBDO), authorized special tribunals to try former politicians for 
“misconduct,” an infraction not clearly defined.  The prosecution of politicians could be 
avoided if the accused did not contest elections or be part of an electoral body for a 
period of seven years.  About 7,000 individuals were tried, including prominent 
politicians, like Suhrawardy and later Shiekh Mujib, in conspiracy cases.276 The courts 
were banned from hearing any case against martial law orders.  Several appeals against 
the imposition of martial law were dismissed by the Supreme Court.277 The much 
trumpeted, so-called political stability was more personalized than institutionalized.278  
The joint opposition was divided and continued to serve its own self-interests.  
Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Jinnah, was made a unanimous candidate for joint opposition, 
but was no match for the powerful Ayub, who had firm control over the state resources.  
He carried out massive rigging in the 1966 elections, utilizing all the state machinery, 
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including the intelligence agencies, at district levels, and the BD members helped him.  
These events led Ayub to win the 1966 elections with a large margin. Ayub also adopted 
a divide and rule policy among the politicians. During this period, Fatima Jinnah, Bhutto 
and Shiekh Mujib emerged as three political leaders from the West and East Pakistan. 
Notwithstanding the above, Rizvi argues that the graph of Ayub’s popularity 
started falling immediately after the 1965 War as he failed to rise up to the expectations 
of the people, unable to win the 1965 War, liberate  Kashmir from India and then, finally, 
by signing the Tashkent agreement, having failed to improve the socio-economic 
conditions of the common man. Just forty-eight hours after the signing of the Tashkent 
agreement, the enraged students and elements from Islamic parties filled the streets, 
including politicians like Maulana Maudadi, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Nawabzada 
Nasrullah Khan and Bhutto.  Politicians tried to give the impression that Ayub Khan had 
sold Kashmir to India by signing a cease-fire agreement.279  Shuja Nawaz argues, 
regarding the culmination of the climax of the 1965 War, “What was being portrayed as a 
magnificent victory over India by Ayub Khan’s propaganda machine produced only 
disillusionment and catalyzed his eventual fall from grace.”280  
Bhutto was an astute politician, who was the foreign minister until 1966, and 
noticed the changes in the wind when Ayub’s popularity was falling.  He resigned from 
Ayub’s cabinet because of the sagging popularity of Ayub and formed his own party as 
The Pakistan People’s Party.281 Bhutto portrayed himself a hero in the eyes of the people 
as he apparently resigned from Ayub’s cabinet because Ayub compromised on Kashmir’s 
cause.  Mujib also managed to mobilize public opinion of the East Pakistanis against the 
West Pakistani marginalization of the Bengalis. 
By the end of 1968, Bhutto managed to successfully exploit the rising socio-
economic forces and by mobilizing public opinion with a strong critique of Ayub.282  
                                                 
279 Talbot, Pakistan a Modern History, 178. 
280 Shuja, Crossed Swords, 214. 
281 Wikipedia, s.v. “Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zulfiqar_Ali_Bhutto#Political_career (accessed December 12, 2011). 
282 Rizvi, The Military and Politics, 167. 
 74
Combined opposition also joined Bhutto and the street protests, along with the people, to 
overthrow Ayub. The situation eventually grew out of control and the country came to a 
virtual halt due to almost daily strikes.  In January 1968, Ayub was reported to have had a 
heart attack from the ongoing strikes and the unproductive results of the 1965 war.  By 
early 1969, Yahya started taking note of the deteriorating law and order situation and 
feared that the armed forces, under the name of Ayub Khan’s army, were being 
discredited in the eyes of the people.283  He was also under pressure from political parties 
to impose martial law.  Under these conditions, the politicians started switching their 
center of support toward army leadership rather than strengthening democratic control.  
Under the prevailing conditions, Ayub Khan had no option but to resign.  However, 
instead of holding elections or handing over his powers to the speaker of assembly, he 
transferred his powers to his most trusted general, Yahya Khan.  Yahya Khan took over 
from Ayub Khan in March 1969 and imposed martial law.  
F. CONCLUSION 
When Ayub took over the country, its overall political and economic conditions 
were in a poor state.  The country’s treasury was virtually empty.  Ayub, using his 
administrative acumen, brought about a revolution in the economic policies of the 
country, which made Pakistan one of the fastest growing economies in Asia. Pakistan 
saw the unprecedented growth rate of 7 percent with an industrial growth of 76 percent, 
which was better than any other Asian country’s growth rate (of 55 percent) during that 
period.  Similarly, he improved growth in the agriculture sector and introduced the 
modern concept of a green revolution by making use of modern technologies and 
building dams. Agricultural growth was raised from 1.3 percent in 1958 to 6.3 percent by 
the mid-1960s.  However, the high growth and industrialized rate relied on extracting 
resources from the rural areas of East Bengal and low wage workers in the West, leading 
to disparities in the country, which were not corrected as the country grew. 
Ayub’s land reforms act was only partially successful as it lacked implementation. 
The large landowners, from whom the land was generally taken, remained unaffected 
                                                 
283 Ibid., 242. 
 75
because only 35 percent of the surrendered land was cultivable.  Moreover, the landlords 
who surrendered the land were adequately compensated.  The results of agricultural 
reforms could not improve the financial miseries of the farmers and people living in the 
rural areas. 
In addition to economic disparities, the 1965 War proved disastrous for Pakistan’s 
economy and to the image of Ayub Khan.  The war had two effects; it not only stopped 
U.S. aid to Pakistan, but foreign investments were  reduced by 25 percent  He failed to 
provide basic facilities like health care and education to the common man.  Instead, the 
cost of manufacturing goods and commodity prices increased due to rapid urbanization 
and the excessive importation of machinery, while exports remained slow.  Workers’ 
wages decreased by 12 percent.  The population growth remained unchecked, which 
brought further difficulties for the poor.  The main beneficiaries of Ayub’s policies were 
twenty-two families, which included his close associates.  These families were virtually 
controlling the major businesses of the country.  I contend that the rapid growth of 
industrialization was due to the inflow of aid, profit incentives and high protectionism to 
local industry.  Of these industries, 35 percent were inefficient and a burden on the 
government.  
Despite having enabled a massive economic improvement in the country, Ayub’s 
policies resulted in class and regional disparities as the major beneficiaries of his policies 
were the targeted industrialists and the urban population of the middle class.  These 
beneficiaries included retired army officers and bureaucrats, while depriving the people 
from rural areas and small Tehsils (small cities), including East Pakistan.  Instead of 
undertaking developments in all parts of Pakistan, Ayub mostly channeled development 
in West Pakistan.  The export-oriented income from the agriculture sector of East 
Pakistan was spent on industrialization in West Pakistan that further sowed the seeds of 
resentment in the majority Bengali population, which alienated them further.  The post 
1965 War period saw a major decline in the economy of the country and proved 
disastrous for Ayub’s regime.  The United States stopped the flow of aid as well military 
supplies to Pakistan.  Ayub’s economic policies gave rise to socio-economic forces that 
caused mass political and socio-economic tensions in the country.  Industrial workers, 
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lower middle-class clerks, student unions and lawyers all played instrumental parts in the 
movement against Ayub. These socio-economic forces were successfully exploited by 
politicians like Bhutto, which was one of the reasons for Ayub’s downfall.   
Ayub’s regime was a disappointment for the majority Bengalis as they initially 
viewed him as incorruptible and clean compared to politicians.  Once Ayub came to 
power, there were two major political parties in East Pakistan, the Awami League and 
Krishak Sramik (peasants and Workers).  In 1962, his political system deprived the 
Bengalis from participating in the decision making in both political and socio-economic 
matters at the national level.  Under his policies, the Bengalis could not act, but only 
react, leading to an increasing number of protests.  The worst occurred when he failed to 
appreciate the growing divide between East and West Pakistanis.  He continued to extend 
a Cinderella treatment to the East Pakistanis and did nothing to alleviate the sufferings of 
the majority Bengalis, who started to view West Pakistanis as usurpers.   Further, his 
economic policies brought a wider gulf between both East and West Pakistan as all 
development was directed toward West Pakistan, while ignoring East Pakistan.  He 
continued to spend more resources in West Pakistan and marginalize the Bengalis, and 
this fuelled the sentiments of the Bengalis.  After the 1965 War, Ayub’s policies further 
cut economic development in Pakistan.  Thus, the annual growth rate in East Pakistan 
declined even more after the 1965 War.  Further, the lack of any defense of East Pakistan 
during the 1965 War, less representation of Bengalis in political activities, and 
discrimination in the jobs provision quota in the federal government further charged their 
nationalistic feelings against Pakistan.  This exacerbated the differences between the 
economies of the two wings of Pakistan.  I contend that some of the concerns raised by 
the Bengalis, such as unequal development and a smaller quota in the military, can be 
attributed to its geographical location to and historical reasons that date back to the 
British recruitment policy.  Similarly, the British disregarded Bengal, with regard to 
undertaking development because of its geographic location. 
Ayub Khan was an authoritarian ruler. Therefore, he did not let democratic 
institutions nurture.  Instead, he devised policies where most of the powers were centered 
on him.  Ayub suppressed the opposition by making wider use of the state machinery and 
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intelligence agencies.  Ayub introduced a concept of electoral participation, known as the 
Basic Democracies System (BD). The BD system became instrumental in a creating 
political culture in Pakistan.  The BD system also brought Ayub closer to the people due 
to direct access of local representatives to the central government by bypassing the 
provinces.  These BD members remained a political instrument to further Ayub’s policies 
and help Ayub Khan in consolidating his hold on power.  The media also remained under 
the strict control of the government.  Ayub continued to suppress any opposition and 
critique of his policies, including the politicians from East Pakistan.  Ayub introduced 
draconian laws with a view to coerce the politicians, such as the “Public Representative 
Office Disqualification act (PRODA)” and the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order 
(EBDO) under which politicians could be tried by the government.  About 7,000 
politicians were tried under these acts.  The courts were barred from hearing any case 
against martial law orders.  Ayub’s policies kept the opposition divided, which allowed 
him to continue for eleven years as president.  He carried out massive rigging in the 1966 
elections, while utilizing state machinery.  During this period, Fatima Jinnah, Bhutto and 
Mujib emerged as three political leaders from West and East Pakistan.  By the end of 
1968, Bhutto managed to successfully exploit the rising socioeconomic forces and 
mobilized public opinion in the form of street protests.  The situation eventually grew out 
of control once Ayub imprisoned the opposition leaders.  The country’s economy came to 
a virtual halt due to almost daily strikes.  By early 1969, Yahya Khan, who was the army 
chief started taking note of the growing law and order situation in the country, as the 
army’s prestige was being damaged under the name of Ayub Khan.  Yahya Khan took 
over from Ayub in a peaceful coup in March 1969 and imposed martial law.   
The fall of Ayub Khan can be attributed to a lack of political culture and 
institutional building, his discriminatory policies toward Bangladeshis, the unexpected 
results from the 1965 War and the signing of the Tashkent cease-fire agreement   Ayub’s 
downfall also occurred due to the unequal distribution of income that gave rise to 
regional and class differences in a country that was successfully exploited by the 
politicians.  These inequalities and treatment with the minorities by the military regime of 
Ayub again led to the cause of the second military takeover.  I contend that the first coup 
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in Pakistan continued to weaken the democratic institutions while further politicizing the 
army.  These events later resulted into affecting the further two coups and ensured the 
army’s role in future politics in Pakistan. 
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE FIRST COUP ON THE PRESENT 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN AND THE 
CONCLUSION    
This chapter is a brief explanation of civil-military relations in Pakistan developed 
in the post-independence period.  The analysis is divided into three periods; the first 
period is under the administration of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto (1971–1977).  This part shows 
that despite bringing the military under democratic civilian control, Bhutto failed to 
consolidate the civilian institutions, which led to his downfall. The second part analyzes 
the post-Zia period of civil-military relations.  It shows that General Zia’s (1988–1999), 
policies, while transferring powers to the civilians, ensured and secured the army’s future 
role in the country’s politics.  The third part explains present and future civil-military 
relations in Pakistan.  It shows that the military will continue to act as a political 
institution in the future politics of Pakistan because of the lack of a democratic 
consolidation process and the all-around security threats to the country.  
A. THE BACKGROUND OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN  
The first military coup, led by Ayub Khan, set up a pattern where foreign or 
domestic policy of Pakistan is crafted with the consent of the military.  This core 
imbalance in civil-military affairs is primarily due to what Pakistan inherited during 
partition.  The country inherited the powerful and hierarchical Pakistani army, and at the 
same time, weak civilian institutions.  The internal and external threats to Pakistan, such 
as those it inherited at the time of partition, have persisted.   I contend that the 
continuation of these threats, external and internal, created and continue to create a major 
imbalance in civil-military relations in Pakistan.  Cohen argues: 
The civil-military relations in Pakistan are central to and inseparable from 
central-province relations, ethno-regional conflict, internal political 
stability, Islamists influence in the polity, the prospects of warfare with 
India, nuclear security, and region and global terrorism.284  
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I agree with some of Cohen’s arguments, such as the security issues, issues with India 
and Afghanistan, and nuclear proliferation, which are central to civil-military relations.  
These factors explain that all-around security threats and nuclear issues are central to 
civil-military relations in Pakistan as the Pakistani military views itself the guardian of its 
national interests, while viewing civilian governments as incompetent and disloyal to the 
country.  The Pakistani military also protects its image and its corporate interests and 
would never want the state to meddle in its internal professional workings.  Huntington 
emphasizes the point that, in order to exert democratic control over the military, the 
military has to be kept professional and autonomous.285  The rest of the issues that Cohen 
has raised, such as central-province relations, ethno-regional conflict, internal, Islamic 
influence in the polity are over-exaggerated and have nothing to do with the military. 
I contend that even today, fifty years after the first military coup (1958), Pakistan 
still faces the threat of another military coup.286 Although the civilian elected government 
has been in office since 2008 in Pakistan, the state continues to be dominated by the 
military.287  The recent statement by Prime Minister Gilani on December 23, 2011, shows 
strong criticism of the continued interference in the internal affairs by the Pakistani army 
leadership.288  The recent issue of the “memo-gate scandal” (which implicates the 
president of Pakistan for hatching a conspiracy against the army), has allowed the 
military to present itself as a better institution over the civilian government. 289  This 
shows that democratic control over the armed forces continues to remain weak in 
Pakistan.290   
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I argue that the numerous reasons that led to the first coup in the Pakistan 
continue to be present today.  The issues that can be handled by politicians are still 
decided by the military, which makes the military believe that it is the savior of the state, 
and what Finer has termed “nationalism and  syndicalism.”291  
The general cycle of military coups also shows that the Pakistani army mostly 
came to power with the assistance of extra-regional powers, civilian institutions 
(judiciary), and opposition personalities, which are always ready to provide widespread 
legitimacy to military regimes.292  For instance, Ayub Khan’s, Zia ul Haq and 
Musharraf’s coups were backed by the United States and duly legitimized by the 
judiciary.  The opposition parties also played significant parts in collaborating with the 
military regimes of the past, which resulted in the coups.  
There have been missed opportunities to stop the cycle, but the civilian regime, 
due to their weakness and the Cold War, were not able to take advantage of those 
moments.  I contend that the only time the civilians in Pakistan could have achieved 
control over the military was during the period of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto (1971–1977) and 
partially during the time of Nawaz Sharif from 1997–1999.  However, during both  
periods, Bhutto’s and Sharif’s, the military ultimately affected the coups because of the 
lack of institutional control, and due to the authoritarian policies of the civilian rulers 
caused by their weakness, as well as the lack of U.S. support for the civilian regimes, 
which has reduced support during the civilian periods due to its own interests. 
B. BHUTTO’S ERA AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto was in an ideal position to offset the effects of the first 
military coup and had laid a firm foundation for future civil-military relations in Pakistan.  
Bhutto made textbook-style changes to assert civilian control over the military as argued 
by Serra and Bruneau in “The Military Transition” and “Who Guards the Guardians.”   
The army’s mission was, for the first time, properly defined and curtailed.293 MoD was 
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staffed with career bureaucrats who had knowledge about the military’s workings.  The 
designation “Commander in Chief” was changed to the respective services’ Chief of 
Staff, The Joint Staff headquarters (JSHQ) was created and brought under control of the 
MoD.  All budget allocation/requirements were routed through Joint Staff Headquarters 
(JSHQ) to have further rationalization of the budget.  The tenure of the army chief was 
reduced from five years to three.  For the first time, the role of the military was defined in 
the 1973 constitution of Pakistan, under article 245; the act of high treason was 
incorporated into the constitution.294  A higher defense organization was created with 
effective control of the civil bureaucracy.  The defense committee of the cabinet was 
formed and the constitution was re-framed, which ensured a confined role for the 
military.   
This section discusses the heightened civil-military tensions due to the creation of 
a parallel security force to dilute the powers of the army and repeated sackings of the 
military chiefs, which led to one of the causes of the third military coup.   
Bhutto’s government created a civilian Federal Security Force (FSF) to strengthen 
the internal security of the country so that the military could remain externally focused 
and to dilute the powers of the military.  However, the FSF was used to suppressing 
Bhutto’s political opponents and further coercing the military generals.295  Bhutto sacked 
the then army chief, General Gul Hasan, and air chief, Air Marshal Rahim Khan.  Two 
years later, another air chief, Zafar Chaudhry was also sacked.  These military chiefs 
were removed because of their refusal to make the army and air force available during a 
police strike.296  Later, all these factors began to escalate civil-military tensions. 297  Soon 
after, due to the ineptitude and failure of a civilian democratically elected government, as 
well as complicit political actors in the opposition, the military found its way back by 
affecting the third military coup, in 1977.  
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Bhutto was a feudal lord, despite having worn the hat of a democratic ruler; his 
policies were hardly different than the policies of military dictators.  Bhutto failed to 
build up civilian democratic institutions.  He had politicized the judiciary and preferred 
resolving political disputes with force.  He silenced the media, opposition and civil 
society, while continuing to humiliate the army leadership.  He carried out massive 
human rights violations in Baluchistan.  He repeated the mistake of his predecessors by 
involving the army in martial law and suppressing Baluchistan insurgency, which were 
actually political issues.  Bhutto rigged the 1977 elections by making extensive use of the 
state machinery, which led to a mass mobilization campaign, led by a joint opposition 
alliance, known as the Pakistan National Alliance, with a common agenda to overthrow 
Bhutto’s regime.  The mass mobilization campaign became uncontrollable and led to the 
imposition of martial law in some of the major cities of Punjab.   
Some army officers who were supposed to be enforcing the martial law refused to 
obey Bhutto’s orders and suppress the people’s demonstration.  Thus, the situation went 
further out of Bhutto’s control.  Finer argues that the military may intervene once it 
refuses to side with the government to curb violence.298   
These events provided space, opportunity and occasion to the then army chief, 
General Zia, to overthrow the government.299  On July 5, 1977, the army overthrew 
Bhutto and took over the government by imposing martial law for the third time.   
I contend that the deadlock between the opposition and the ruling party provided 
space to the army, while the judiciary legitimized the coup, as per the practice in vogue.  
The frequent involvement of the army in martial law, as explained in Chapter I, 
emboldened the army’s confidence that it could handle civil affairs better than the 
politicians. The coup was also legitimized and welcomed by the United States in the form 
of providing billions of dollars of military aid to the dictator who was ready to fight the 
Soviet Union in a proxy war.   
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I contend that sacking the military generals and curtailing the powers of the 
military is not sufficient for assertion of civilian control over the military.  It can only be 
achieved by initiating the process of institutionalization of the democratic institutions, 
political culture, rule of law and accountability at all levels.  Bhutto failed to 
institutionalize civilian control and lost the ideal opportunity for bringing the military 
under democratic control. 
C. THE POST-ZIA ERA AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
Eleven years of Zia’s authoritarian rule thus further institutionalized the army’s 
role in the country’s politics. Rizvi argues that the emergence of post-coup d’ etat civilian 
regimes in Pakistan have been no different than other military states that have 
experienced prolonged military rule.300  Pakistan is, therefore, one of the countries where 
the military, while transferring powers to civilians, also ensured and secured its future 
role in the power politics of the country.  The Pakistan military also shaped itself into an 
autonomous and a political actor with all the capabilities for pulling the strings of power-
politics from the sidelines, while transferring power to the civilians.301  
The Pakistani army played an instrumental role in the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and remained hand-in-glove with the U.S. government.  During the period from 
1979 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, the army was involved in key foreign 
policy matters and key strategic decision-making issues.  As mentioned in Chapter II, the 
intellectual gap between the modern Pakistani army and the civil society had already 
opened, once the army joined the Western block.  These events further widened the 
intellectual gap and the institutional superiority between the army and the other civilian 
institutions of Pakistan.   
Post-Zia civilian regimes thus inherited a weak democratic structure and soon saw 
a power tussle between the four powerful institutions, the president, the army chief, the 
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prime minister and the judiciary.  The power struggle between these institutions 
continued until the fourth coup by General Musharraf, in 1999. 302   
General Zia left a powerful presidential system in the country, while Pakistan’s 
was based on the British parliamentary system.  One of the causes of the power tussle 
between the president and the prime minister was because of the incorporation of article 
58 in the constitution by General Zia, which gave unbridled power to the president over 
the prime minister.  During this period, the army emerged as kingmaker and referee 
between Presidents Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Farooq Leghari and Prime Minister Sharif.  This 
period also saw emergence of the president-army nexus, as both (the army leadership and 
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan) were the legacies of General Zia.  This nexus further 
dented civil-military relations and weakened the democratic institutions.  
The only political party on the scene was Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP).  The 
PPP was disliked by the military regime because of the fear of a backlash and the 
atrocities committed by army regimes against the PPP politicians.  Benazir was also 
considered a security risk by the military because of a fear of rolling back Pakistan’s 
nuclear program by Benazir, under the influence of the West.   
The Army leadership thus handpicked an elite industrialist from Punjab, Nawaz 
Sharif, who was prepared as a leader of Islami Jamohri Itihad (IJI), to counterbalance the 
political power of the PPP in the forthcoming 1988 elections.303  General Aslam Beg, the 
then Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), admitted in 1995 that the Army did not trust the 
PPP.304 Nawaz Sharif, with the full financial support of the army and the president 
contested the elections of 1988.  I contend that the Pakistan military wanted to protect its 
corporate interests and autonomous status by keeping Benazir Bhutto from coming to 
power. 
Elections were held and the PPP won with a narrow margin (38.5 percent of the 
seats), while the IJI, led by Nawaz Sharif, gained 30 percent of the votes, thus emerging 
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as the second-largest party in the election and the government in Punjab the largest 
province.305  The military-president, (Ishaq Khan) nexus managed to limit the scale of the 
expected PPP national election victory in 1988, using the ISI as a tool to influence the 
political process by promoting the creation of the IJI.   
Pakistan, during the post-Zia period had become what Samuel Huntington 
describes as a “praetorian society,”306 where the regime is dominated by the military, or a 
coalition of military and bureaucracy, as a consequence of the inability of weak civilian 
institutions to assert control over the armed forces. 
As a result, when Benazir came to power as prime minister, she found herself 
trapped in a difficult situation because: (1) Benazir could not get the political parties 
together to neutralize the growing power of the army.  The opposition parties preferred to 
look toward army leadership to eliminate other opponents from the political scene.  (2)  
The organized military leadership was better placed to exert its influence over the prime 
minister. (3) General Zia’s constitutional engineering (article 58) had given 
insurmountable powers to the president who had no direct role in the parliamentary form 
of government.  Thus, Benazir and the other prime ministers, in the following years, 
remained under pressure and influence of the military and could not exert effective 
civilian control over the affairs of the state.  The power politics between the institutions 
continued with no one ready to show any flexibility.307  This resulted in the dismissal of 
four governments (Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, two governments each).308   
During the elections of 1990, the military played a key role in rigging the 
elections and distributed enormous funds, with the support of  Ghulam Ishaq Khan and 
the then Army Chief General Aslam Baig to PPP political opponents.309  These political 
parties were the IJI, Jamat-e-Islami and some other political parties.  The period from 
1988 to 1997 saw a power struggle between the president and the prime ministers, while 
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the last tenure of Nawaz Sharif from 1997 to 1999 saw a power tussle between the 
judiciary, the army chief and the prime minister.  
Nawaz Sharif came to power, as a result of 1997 elections by winning 2/3rd 
majority seats.  This time, Sharif was in position to bring constitutional changes and weed 
out draconian presidential powers to dissolve assemblies.  Most of the authors and social 
scientists in Pakistan and around the world were of the view that the period of coups in 
Pakistan was over. Nawaz Sharif did away with the presidential powers under 58.2 (b).  
He also clipped the powers of national assembly members to cross the floor (changing 
loyalties).  However, Sharif also emerged as an authoritarian ruler, being a legacy of the 
military regime.  Sharif wanted to concentrate all powers within him.  He also tried to 
coerce the judiciary.  During the period from 1997–1999, the army remained subservient 
to civilian authorities until Sharif started jeopardizing the corporate interests of the army 
and other civilian institutions like the judiciary.  Nawaz Sharif removed the then army 
chief General Jehangir Karamat over a petty issue.310  Then, due to Sharif’s policies, the 
naval chief resigned.  Sharif was also accused of coercing the media men.  Then the 
friction between Sharif and the army chief rose to unbearable limits on a number of 
issues, such as the Kargil War, promotions/appointments of officers and Sharif even 
sacked General Musharraf once.  These factors resulted in a coup d’ etat by Musharraf 
and his loyal generals in October 1999.  The fourth coup was a reactionary coup and was 
caused by the heightening of civil military tensions to an unbearable level.  
The civil-military friction heightened because:311  1) The prime minister had 
earlier removed two service chiefs over a petty issue.  Few army generals believed that 
the prime minister had damaged the prestige of the army by prematurely removing the 
former chiefs.  2) A difference of opinion with the then army chief, General Pervez 
Musharraf, over the appointment of the generals and the Kargil War. 3)  The removal of 
General Musharraf (in a humiliating way) while Musharraf was in an airplane on his way 
back from an official trip to Sri Lanka. 4)  Sharif made another mistake by selecting 
Musharraf’s successor from among the engineering corps, against the traditions of the 
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army.  In the Pakistan army, the chiefs have traditionally been from the fighting arms. 
The Pakistan army is very hierarchical and proud of maintaining its values and corporate 
interests.  5)  Sharif’s third mistake was to supersede (in the absence of Musharraf) two 
fighting arms generals, who were in key positions in the army.  These generals were 
instrumental in staging the fourth coup.  Musharraf’s coup was validated by the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Irshad A Khan.312  Also, the opposition political 
parties, and the people, in general, welcomed Musharraf’s coup.   
The fourth coup, in Figure 4, shows that the Pakistani army maintains a 
centralized, hierarchical, and cohesive structure that remains insulated from outside 
interferences.  The generals, in the absence of the army chief, were loyal to the army over 
the civilian government.313  The army also protected its values, traditions and corporate 
interests by not allowing the prime minister to promote a non-fighting arms officer (an 
engineering corps officer).  The analysis also shows that civil-military relations before 
the fourth coup were at their lowest ebb. 
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Figure 4.   The Fourth Military Coup 
I contend that the three earlier coups were proactive, while the fourth coup was 
purely a reactionary coup.  Analysis of the post-Zia, Pakistan army shows that the army 
still maintained a bounce-back capacity, in the form of the coup d’ etat if its corporate 
interests were threatened.314   
In between the third and fourth coups (1989–1999), the military was afforded 
many opportunities by the divided and corrupt politicians. However, the military did not 
intervene.  It preferred to exert its influence once its interests were jeopardized.  After the 
deaths of General Zia and Bhutto there was a political vacuum in the country.  Then, 
throughout the period between 1990 and 1999, there was a repeated power struggle 
between the three power brokers of the country; the army, the president and the prime 
minister; the judiciary has only recently emerged as a political actor in Pakistan. 
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The fourth coup changed the political wrangling, which largely revolved around 
the relationship between the PPP and the PML (N) and the military leadership.  The army 
had developed close relations with the PML (N) since the Zia period and, conversely, had 
an antagonistic association with the PPP after Bhutto’s execution.  Now it appears that 
the army is likely to distance itself from the PML (N) and may no longer tango with the 
party that was used as a counter-weight to the PPP in the post-Zia period. 
President Musharraf remained President/Chief Executive of the country from 
1999–2008. Musharraf remained a darling of the United States and was wholeheartedly 
supported by the United States, until he started displaying a lukewarm attitude toward the 
United States regarding undertaking military action in FATA areas.  Cohen argues that, 
like his military predecessors, Musharraf was a failure, as ten years rule of Musharraf 
failed to bring Pakistan’s economy back on track.  Musharraf lacked strategic vision and 
did not set any priorities, while targeting one issue after another.   
During Musharraf’s period, civil-military relations were further affected when he 
replaced civil bureaucrats with military officers in some of the important civil sectors.  
I contend that military officers lack strategic vision as they are not trained to 
perform tasks pertinent to the civil sector.  However, Musharraf was determined that if he 
banked on the military, he would be successful in changing the fate of the country.315  
Cohen argues, and I quote:  “Musharraf rejected my suggestion during our meeting, by 
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politicians.”316 Musharraf became unpopular when he signed a controversial deal with the 
Pakistan people’s party under the NRO, while utilizing his presidential powers to 
condone all outstanding corruption cases in the courts against the politicians.  Musharraf 
had to resign due to the sacking of the chief justice of Pakistan.  Musharraf, again, 
heavily staffed civil bureaucratic appointments with military officers.  The ministry of 
defense was staffed with retired army officers, with the exception of one civilian 
bureaucrat.  Some of Musharraf’s close associates were employed at very lucrative 
appointments in the civil sector.  Musharraf’s decline started and his policies failed due to 
the following: 1) fiscal and administrative devolution to districts, which further weakened 
the power of the provincial governments.317  2)  Musharraf gave freedom to the media 
with the opening of approximately 80 independent TV channels.  The independent and 
free media gave rise to the mobilization of political culture and the activation of a vibrant 
and a free civil society as a watch dog, which became very critical of Musharraf’s 
policies.318  3)  Musharraf’s last nail in the coffin was the sacking of the chief justice of 
Pakistan.  The sacking was widely reported by the media and resulted in a mass 
mobilization of lawyers and civil rights activists, which led to Musharraf’s resignation.  
The opposition ruling party and judiciary united with the free society to resist future 
military interventions.319 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE POST MUSHARRAF PERIOD AND CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS  
The post-Musharraf period has seen not only numerous civil-military crises but a 
judiciary-civil crisis and the crisis between the political leaders, as well.  The post-
Musharraf army leadership of General Kayani, who took office in 2007, remained, 
initially, subservient to civilian authorities and the military extended full cooperation in 
order to establish a writ of the government over the state institutions. 
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In fact, it was the army leadership that prevented the political crisis once the 
ruling PPP refused to reinstate the sacked chief justice of Pakistan, resulting in the worst 
form of political stalemate.  This was a golden opportunity for the army chief to take over 
because the politicians were divided and the judicial crises were going on.  General 
Kayani successfully intervened in March 2009 in order to defuse a stand-off between the 
political leaders.   He brokered a deal between the president and Nawaz Sharif to reinstate 
Chief Justice (CJ) Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry and thus avoided a major political 
turmoil. 320  In addition, Kayani voluntarily recalled all the military officers from civilian 
departments, which were deputed into civil departments.  
It is meaningful to analyze the statement given by the Chief of the Army Staff 
(COAS), General Kayani at the first Corps Commanders’ Conference (CCC) following 
the general elections of February 28, 2008, since it reflects the line of conduct to follow 
in his relationship with the newly elected civilian authorities.  One hundred seven CCC 
members outlined the framework of civil-military relations after the end of a decade-long 
period of military rule. 321  A framework was centered on the following key elements: 
(i). The army fully stands behind the democratic process and is committed to 
play its constitutional role in support of the elected government. 
(ii). The Army will stay out of the political process and will not be dragged 
into unnecessary controversy.   
(iii) The COAS shows optimism about a harmonized relationship between the 
various pillars of the state as provided in the constitution, in order to 
maximize the smooth working of the civilian government. 
(iv) Schism at any level, given the current circumstances, would not be in the 
larger interest of the Nation. 
Despite the fact that the army leadership was very forthcoming in extending its 
cooperation to the military, I contend that the civilian regimes that had been succeeding 
military rule in Pakistan faced a serious identity crisis as they have to strike the proper 
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balance between asserting their autonomy without alienating the military.  I argue that for 
the transiting democracies, the military’s support, or neutrality is crucial for the 
government’s survival.  In that regard, the heated or muffled exchanges between civil and 
military leadership in the past two years confirm that analysis. 
Talat Masood, a defense analyst of Pakistan, points out that “Kayani has been 
very supportive of the democratic process and has clearly distanced himself from politics, 
but there is a need for reforms to institutionalize the process that is so far, entirely 
depending on one man, General Kayani.”322  General Kayani has also set up the first 
precedent by regularly coming to the parliament sessions and, when summoned, to 
answer defense-related questions.  The control of MoD over the military has been 
partially increased.  All budget proposals have been routing through the MoD and 
ministry of finance after thorough deliberation and rationalization; however, the army 
still maintains its say because the secretaries of defense in the MoD have always been 
appointed with the recommendations of the Army Chiefs.   
Notwithstanding the above, the army has also shown its strength where army’s 
corporate interests have been jeopardized, such as:  1). The Corps Commanders in the 
122nd conference, held in 2010, publicly expressed serious concerns regarding clauses 
impacting national security included in the so-called Kerry-Lugar bill. 323  The forum 
announced it had issued a warning to the government, against signing the U.S. bill. 2). On 
July 27, 2008, Pakistan’s cabinet division issued a formal notification placing the ISI 
under the minister of the interior in an attempt to break the link with the army, thus 
prompting strong opposition by both the army and then President Musharraf. Within 
hours, before leaving for an official visit to Washington, PM Gilani had to reverse the 
order, arguing misinterpretation.  Likewise, Gilani’s second attempt to deal with the 
secret service was no more successful when, three days after the Mumbai attack, Gilani 
considered sending the DG ISI to Delhi, a move that the defense analyst, Shereen Mazari, 
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describes as a bizarre behavior of the leadership. 324  3) The three-year extension given to 
the army chief and the one year to the DG ISI shows that the army still maintains 
influence over the civilian government. 4). Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has quite 
often been a visitor of army headquarters in the past.  This shows the political strength of 
the army. 5). The policy statements that should be coming from the foreign office or the 
prime minister continue to emanate from army headquarters.  6). The army holds a 
monopoly on the three army forces with regard to the appointments of senior officers.  
The president of the NDU has always been from the army.  Most of the chairman joint 
chiefs have been from the army.  The director general of the ISI and the Strategic Plans 
Division (Nuclear Command Authority) has always been from the army.  In the lucrative 
UN peacekeeping missions, army headquarters has a complete monopoly, while the navy 
and air force have no representation.  All secretaries of defense have been from the army.  
The coast guard, which is primarily the role of the navy, is headed by the army’s top 
brass.  
I contend that in order to maintain effective civilian control the above mentioned 
appointments should be evenly distributed to generate service rivalry, with the exception 
of the secretary of defense who should be a carrier bureaucrat to maintain effective 
civilian control over the military. 
Of late, certain policy decisions taken by the government, have led to an increase 
in civil-military tension in Pakistan, such as the famous issue of the memo scandal.  The 
issue of memo-scandal was aimed to implicate the president of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari 
and Hussain Haqqani, the Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States.  They were 
accused of conspiring against the Pakistan army.325  The tension rose further between the 
executive and the army when the Army and the ISI chiefs gave affidavits in court that 
“who is behind the memo issue,” must be investigated, thus openly challenging the 
civilians. 
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The prime minister of Pakistan, in a recent statement, has accused the army of 
violating its constitutional limits.  I quote: “We will not allow the rise of the states within 
the state, while being strongly critical of Pakistan army.”326  In return, the army was 
equally critical of the remarks uttered by the prime minister.  The army spokesman stated 
that, “the army leadership did not act unconstitutionally, while mentioning that the 
remarks uttered by the prime minister may have very dangerous consequences.” 327  The 
Inter-Services Public Relations department has recently rebuffed and been critical of 
statements given by the prime minister against the army in the public media. 328   
I contend that the prime minister and the president, who are already facing 
corruption charges in the court, could not afford another memo issue scandal.  Both the 
president and the prime minister tried their best to politicize the army by forcing it to 
withdraw its support from the memo issue; however, the army chief has refused to act in 
what he terms a violation of the constitution. In retaliation, the prime minister sacked the 
secretary of defense on January 11, 2012.  He was a retired general and was placed as 
secretary of defense on the recommendations of the army chief.329  
Tanvir Ahmed Khan (the ex-foreign secretary), in a recent editorial in the “The 
News Pakistan,” mentions that the current civil-military tension in Pakistan emerged 
when the armed forces are not particularly assertive and have, in fact expressed a 
willingness to extend support to the new political system.330  He also mentions that “the 
inherent sense of insecurity in the new leadership led to poorly conceived initiatives to 
curb the armed forces.” 331 
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E. FUTURE CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN 
This section argues that in Pakistan there is less of a chance of future coups due to 
changing internal and external political environments in the country.  However, due to 
weak civilian institutions and external threats to the country, the military will continue to 
act as a powerful power broker in the country.   
During the cold war, military regimes were often tolerated by both sides as long 
as they represented a close ally in the overall game but, in today’s globalized world, 
where the economy is high on the agenda, democracy is widely considered the most 
suitable type of regime to ensure desired development, even if the notion of democracy 
itself is subject to different interpretations.  Since Pakistan opted again for a civilian 
elected government in February 2008, Myanmar is the last country where the military is 
still in power. In the emerging political scenario, the military may maintain a position of 
equidistance from both major political parties the PML (N) and the PPP in the country.  
To that extent, GHQ would no longer have any favorite side between these two major 
parties.  Perhaps a level playing field for the all the political parties could emerge till such 
a as time the army decides to back one particular party against another. 
With regard to the future of the civil military relations in Pakistan, Cohen argues, 
“Pakistan is unlikely to extricate itself from its “path dependent patterns” (history of the 
military coups) of tolerating a gross imbalance of power between the military and the 
civilians.”332  Cohen points out that the imbalance continues to be maintained since the 
partition of Pakistan. This factor has been adequately covered in Chapter II.  Cohen also 
asserts, “In Pakistan the military continues to defy the civilian democratic control and 
where military intervention is plausible, if not widely considered legitimate, mechanism 
of the regime change.”333  Cohen has also brought out that the civil society in Pakistan is 
weak and because of that, the military gains prominence.334  I challenge Cohen’s 
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assertion and argue that the previous military regimes have been thrown away by the 
power of the people and the civil society.  Thus, I do not agree with Cohen. 
I contend that unless the military is kept autonomous, and its corporate interests 
are not threatened, the military will stay sterile and continue to cooperate with the 
civilians.  However, because of the weak civilian institutions and the divisions among the 
politicians, the military will remain a powerful broker in the country, lest the judiciary, 
civilian institutions, civil society and the opposition are on one note.  The current 
Judicial–ruling government crisis may again provide a vacuum in the army.  If the above 
crisis prevails in country, the Chief Justice of Pakistan may, under article 90, 
request/order the army to supervise free and fair elections, if the Chief Justice declares 
the rule of the present government unconstitutional.  There is only a remote possibility of 
this happening 
I also argue that future coups in Pakistan are a very remote possibility because all 
four actors in  Pakistan power politics—(1) The judiciary (2) the civil society and people 
(3) The opposition political parties and  (4) The United States (who have always backed 
military regimes in Pakistan)—have emerged as strong critics of military rule.  Further, 
geopolitical changes in the world and on the international scene do not favor the 
reemergence of military regimes.  The military, under the present scenario, when the 
country’s economy is in dire crises, will never even venture to attempt a coup. 
Lately, the judiciary has declared the previous rule of General Musharraf illegal.  
Also, the present Chief Justice, while recently addressing the graduating senior army 
officers at NDU Islamabad, pointed out that “Army takeovers in future will be 
unconstitutional and be considered as an act of treason.335” Recently, when the prime 
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the chief justice remarked, “We assume that nothing will occur and only the 
constitutional order will prevail.336”  Earlier, all four coups had the backing of the 
judiciary.  
The civil society and media, which were not strong earlier, have emerged as very 
strong institutions.  In fact, the downfall of General Musharraf is attributed to a vibrant 
and active civil society in Pakistan.  With freedom of the press and the introduction of 80 
more TV channels and Internet access, it has become very difficult to hide anything from 
the public.337  I contend that the civil society, with the backing of the media, will resist 
any attempt of future coups.  Recently, the army chief and the ISI have been openly 
criticized in the media, which is unprecedented in the history of Pakistan. 
Earlier, the Pakistan army was supported throughout by the U.S. and Pakistani 
military regimes, and compared to civilian regimes, has been the largest recipient of U.S. 
aid.338  Cohen, points out that in “most of the last century, the United States has been a 
partner of the military dictators, whole heartedly embracing all four generals who have 
ruled Pakistan.” 339  Presidents from Kennedy to Bush have invited them to state dinners 
and for intimate consultations, since the independence of Pakistan.340  However, lately, 
the U.S. government has also vowed to consolidate democracy in Pakistan.  
In fact, the pressure by the United States to revert to the normalization of 
democratic rule began to mount on Musharraf soon after he took over.  However, post-
9/11 incidents and the U.S. war on terror helped strengthened Musharraf’s authoritarian 
rule, until 2008.  I contend that, in the future, the Pakistani Army being a major 
component of the ongoing war on terror will not be enough a reason for the United States 
to compromise again on its stated democratic values. Also, the post-Bin Laden incident 
of May 2, 2011 with the chain of events that followed, brought U.S.-Pakistan military 
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relations to their lowest ebb. 341  The relations between the two countries have further 
deteriorated as a result of the unilateral operation of U.S. forces that killed 24 Pakistani 
soldiers on November 26, 2011.342  The recent U.S. media reports against the Pakistan 
army have been a new phenomenon and change of indicators.343  I contend that future 
coups will not be supported by the United States. 
I also do not agree to some of the recent assertions emanating from the U.S. press, 
which allege that a military coup might occur within the Pakistani army because of the 
inability of General Kayani to respond to U.S. actions in the aftermath of the Bin Laden 
incident and the attack on a Pakistani check post.344  The Economic Times of the United 
States in an article on June 11, 2011, with the heading of “General Kayani Fighting to 
Survive U.S. Media” states that “the prospects of the coup in the Pakistan army have 
started to look real after the Laden incident.”345  I argue that the Pakistani military is a 
professional military and strongly maintains hierarchical values and strictly follows chain 
of command.  The chances of a coup within the military are negligible.  The history of 
the Pakistani army shows that the halfhearted attempts at coups were unearthed during 
the planning process, against civilian regimes.  It was the army who unearthed all the 
coups.  
Additionally, international environments, including donor organizations, may also 
play a substantial role in extending any loans or aid in case of a coup.  Yusufa Crookes, 
World Bank (WB) country director for Pakistan, states that his organization had already 
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reduced its lending during the last year of General Musharraf’s tenure (2007–2008) as the 
bank was accused of extending assistance to Pakistan during the military regimes. 346  
As the saying goes, money is the sinew of war; therefore, it is essential for the 
government to gain control of all spending, including that of the armed forces.  As Mr. 
Syed Fakhar Imam says, for the first time, some details of the defense budget were 
presented to Parliament in 2008, whereas previously only the total amount of expected 
expenditures was presented.  In the same way, the ISI budget has also been discussed, a 
very positive step toward ensuring civilian control over the military and the 
intelligence.347 
Recently, the opposition leader, Mian Nawaz Sharif, after the fourth coup against 
General Musharraf, has emerged as a strong critic of the military.  Sharif has 
categorically mentioned that his party will prevent any future military role in politics 
while demanding that the military budget and ISI’s budget must be discussed in 
parliament.348  Also, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, the present ruling 
government of PPP has criticized the growing military role in politics and has 
recommended that measures be devised to confine the military within its own 
constitutional limits.349  The people have realized that thirty years of military rule in 
Pakistan has weakened democratic institutions and brought further misery to the people.  
I contend that the key to reducing military dominance in Pakistan is to reduce the 
tensions with India as well as Afghanistan.  However, the chances of reducing tensions 
with India in the near future are not plausible. 
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Therefore, the military will continue to play a dominant role and will not act 
unless the corporate interests of the military, such as Afghan and Indian policy matters, 
are threatened.350  Also, other institutions in Pakistan are still weak and in the process of 
democratic consolidation.   
F. CONCLUSION  
This paper examines the causes of the first military coup in Pakistan: Why did it 
occur and why does the first military coup matter? The first chapter explains the 
theoretical reasons of military coups in the world in general.   It argues that military 
intervention occurs for various reasons, which include military professionalism, corporate 
interests, patriotism, syndicalism, the rise of civil-military tensions, occasion, disposition 
and the opportunity to intervene, as various authors have noted.  Then it explains the 
background and the reasons that led to the emergence of the Pakistan army as a more 
powerful institution compared to the civilians institutions.  It shows that some of the root 
causes of the first coup in Pakistan lie in the pre-partition era and date back to the 
evolution of British civil-military relations in the sub-continent. The British had devised 
effective civilian control over the military as they recruited more troops from minority 
ethnicities areas, like Punjab, which later formed part of Pakistan.  The British-devised 
policies also generated good will among the locals (recruitment areas) by offering more 
perks and privileges to soldiers.  This resulted in the creation of a strong military bond 
between people of Punjab and the army.  Most of the British recruitment areas later 
formed part of Pakistan.  The inherited infrastructure of Pakistan, such as the political 
leadership (with no roots among the people), geographical boundaries, division of 
resources, lack of trained civil servants and external and internal threats, the outbreak of 
the Kashmir War, internal law and order problems, and finally the already-trained 
professional army were the contributory factors that made the Pakistani leadership 
dependent on army leadership at the time of partition. 
 
                                                 
350 Rana Shah, “The Rogue Democracy,” The News, January 11, 2012,  
 102
Chapter II explains the causes of the first military coup in Pakistan.  It argues that 
there were multiple causes of the first military coup.  The Pakistani military was already 
professional and had inherited British traditions and professionalism.  On the other hand, 
the political leadership, which had advocated for the cause of Pakistan, had no roots 
among the people.  Pakistan’s problems were compounded when its leaders died soon 
after partition, thus leaving a vacuum in the country.  In the absence of a constitution, 
democracy could not really flourish as post-independence Pakistan had only one political 
party, i.e., the Muslim League.  This created a vacuum readily filled by religious parties 
that succeeded in acting as major pressure groups, despite a poor track record in electoral 
representation.  These events further led to the collapse of political institutions. 
Other factors that saw the emergence of the powerful Pakistani army were the 
internal and external threats to the country.  Soon after the independence of Pakistan, the 
Kashmir War started and events led the Pakistani to believe that Pakistan was facing 
existential threats from both India and Afghanistan.  Internally, its two provinces were 
also facing insurgency.  Thus, the first priority of the political leadership in Pakistan was 
to suitably equip the Pakistan army.  Pakistan, in a quest for survival, military aid and 
training, formed alliances with the United States.  The regular interaction of a weak army 
with a modern Western state made its leadership a modern thinker, while the society 
remained backward and illiterate.  
In parallel, the issues of political authority, culture, language and economic justice 
gained eminence in the post-partition era.  The majority Bengalis were marginalized and 
kept from the political process by delaying the formation of the constitution until 1956.  
After the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, the other politicians could not hold the 
parties together and kept fighting with each other. They preferred their own self-interests 
over national interests.  The internal law and order situation, which could have been 
controlled politically, was controlled by involving the army and imposing frequent 
martial law.  These events led army leadership and the people of Pakistan to believe that 
civilians were incompetent and the army could handle administrative affairs better.  A 
decay in political institutions led to the rise of a strong bureaucracy and the army nexus, 
which further damaged the political institutions.  The bureaucrats’ military-nexus 
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emerged as a result of the political vacuum in the country.  The bureaucrats, in 
collaboration with the military leadership, played an instrumental part in discrediting the 
politicians before the public. They replaced seven prime ministers and eight cabinets, 
within eleven years of the independence of Pakistan, and up until the first military coup 
by General Ayub Khan, in 1958.   
I contend that the first coup in Pakistan was caused by weak political institutions 
and divided politicians who had no grass roots level support.  A lack of institutional 
control and a delay in the formation of a constitution, plus a powerful and professional 
army, brimming with a sense of nationalism, also contributed to the coup.  Other factors 
include syndicalism, patriotism and corporate interest, internal security and 
administrative duties that could otherwise have been resolved politically, and internal and 
external threats along with a clean and non-corrupt army that emerged as a savior of the 
state.  External influences and modern education caused a division between the less 
educated society and the modern army.  These events provided space to the army 
leadership, which found occasion, opportunity and the disposition to intervene and, 
thereby, effected the first coup in Pakistan. 
My analysis of present civil-military relations in Pakistan indicates that future 
military intervention in Pakistan is a remote possibility as some of the institutions, like 
the judiciary and civil society, have come of age.  However, the army will continue to 
remain a power broker and an arbitrator in the country’s politics because of a lack of 
political culture and leadership.  The people of Pakistan still view its army as a 
prestigious institution and the savior of the state.  Chapter III explains the economic 
policies of Ayub Khan, Ayub’s treatment of the ethnic minorities and civilians that led to 
the third military takeover, by General Yahya Khan.  This chapter shows that the first 
coup, which had set up a cycle of coups, also gave rise to the second military coup 
because of a lack of institutional control and the authoritarian policies of General Ayub 
Khan.  When Ayub took over the country, its overall political and economic conditions 
were in a poor state.  The country’s treasury was virtually empty.  Ayub, using his 
administrative acumen, brought about a revolution in the economic policies of the 
country, which made Pakistan one of the fastest growing economies in Asia. Ayub also 
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utilized the U.S. and international donors’ aid in bringing improvement in primarily the 
industrial sector. He also provided incentive, which saw a rise in middle urban class 
businessmen; however, Ayub’s economic policies could not trickle down to poor regions 
like East Pakistan and the rural areas.  High industrial growth relied on extracting 
resources from the rural areas of East Bengal, and low wage workers in the West, which 
led to disparities in the country that were not addressed as the country grew. 
Ayub’s government introduced the concept of a green revolution in the country by 
bringing revolutionary reforms in the agriculture sector.  Ayub’s land reforms act was 
only partially successful as it lacked implementation.  In addition to economic disparities, 
the 1965 War proved disastrous for Pakistan’s economy and to the image of Ayub Khan.  
The war had two effects: it not only stopped U.S. aid to Pakistan, but foreign investments 
were reduced by 25 percent.  Ayub failed to provide basic facilities like health care and 
education to the common man.  The main beneficiaries of Ayub’s policies were twenty-
two families, which included his close associates.  
Despite having enabled a massive economic improvement in the country, Ayub’s 
policies resulted in class and regional disparities as the major beneficiaries of his policies 
were the targeted industrialists and the urban population of the middle class.  These 
beneficiaries included retired army officers and bureaucrats, while depriving the people 
from rural areas and Tehsils (small cities), including East Pakistan.  Instead of 
undertaking development in all parts of Pakistan, Ayub mostly channeled development in 
West Pakistan.  The export-oriented income from the agriculture sector of East Pakistan 
was spent on industrialization in West Pakistan, which further sowed the seeds of 
resentment in the majority Bengali population, and alienated them further.  The post-1965 
War period saw a major decline in the economy of the country and proved disastrous for 
Ayub’s regime.  The U.S. stopped the flow of aid as well as military supplies to Pakistan.  
Ayub’s economic policies gave rise to socio-economic forces that caused mass political 
and socio-economic tensions in the country.  Industrial workers, lower middle-class 
clerks, student unions and lawyers all played instrumental parts in the movement against 
Ayub.   
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These socio-economic forces were successfully exploited by politicians like 
Bhutto, which was one of the reasons for Ayub’s downfall.  Ayub’s regime also came as 
a disappointment for the majority Bengalis as they initially viewed him as incorruptible 
and clean compared to other politicians.  In 1962, his political system deprived the 
Bengalis from participating in decision making, in both political and socio-economic 
matters, at the national level.  Ayub’s economic policies also brought a wider gulf 
between both East and West Pakistan as all development was directed toward West 
Pakistan, while ignoring East Pakistan.  He continued to spend more resources in West 
Pakistan and marginalized the Bengalis, while fuelling Bengalis sentiments.  After the 
1965 War, Ayub’s policies further cut economic development in Pakistan.  This 
exacerbated the differences between the economies of the two wings of Pakistan.  I 
contend that some of the concerns raised by the Bengalis, such as unequal development 
and a smaller quota in the military, can be attributed to its geographical location and 
historical reasons that date back to the British recruitment policy.  Similarly, the British 
disregarded Bengal, with regard to undertaking development, because of its geographic 
location.  Ayub Khan was an authoritarian ruler. Therefore, he did not let democratic 
institutions nurture.  Instead, he devised policies where most of the powers were centered 
on him.  Ayub suppressed the opposition by making wider use of the state machinery and 
intelligence agencies, while introducing the concept of electoral participation known as 
the Basic Democracies System (BD).  The BD system became instrumental in a creating 
political culture in Pakistan.  These BD members remained a political instrument to 
further Ayub’s policies and help Ayub Khan in consolidating his hold on power.  Ayub 
introduced draconian laws with a view to coerce the politicians, such as the “Public 
Representative Office Disqualification Act (PRODA)” and the Elective Bodies 
Disqualification Order (EBDO) under which politicians could be tried by the 
government.  Ayub’s policies kept the opposition divided, which allowed him to continue 
for eleven years as president.  He rigged  the 1966 elections, while utilizing state 
machinery.  During this period, Fatima Jinnah, Bhutto and Mujib emerged as three 
political leaders from West and East Pakistan.  By the end of 1968, Bhutto managed to 
successfully exploit the rising socioeconomic forces and mobilize public opinion in the 
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form of street protests.  The country’s economy came to a virtual halt due to almost daily 
strikes.  By early 1969, Yahya Khan, who was the army chief, started taking note of the 
growing law and order situation in the country, as the army’s prestige was being damaged 
under the name of Ayub Khan.  Yahya Khan took over from Ayub in a peaceful coup in 
March 1969 and imposed martial law.  The army took over once its prestige was being 
damaged under the name of army.  The army also felt that it was in the best interest of the 
state to take over from Ayub Khan. 
The fall of Ayub Khan can be attributed to a lack of political culture and 
institutional building, his discriminatory policies toward Bangladeshis, the unexpected 
results from the 1965 War and the signing of the Tashkent cease-fire agreement.   Ayub’s 
downfall also occurred because of the unequal distribution of income that gave rise to 
regional and class differences in a country that was successfully exploited by politicians.  
These inequalities and the treatment of minorities by the military regime of Ayub, led to 
the cause of the second military takeover.  I contend that the roots of the first coup in 
Pakistan also lie in the first coup against Ayub Khan.  
Chapter IV explains the background of the evolution of civil-military relations in 
Pakistan.  It analyses civil-military relations during the Bhutto’s period, and after General 
Zia’s period. This chapter also discusses present civil-military relations in Pakistan. It 
attempts to determine future military relations in Pakistan. Pakistan’s first coup set up a 
pattern and created an imbalance where, in Pakistan, no foreign or domestic policy can be 
crafted without the approval of the military.  Today, in the year 2012, fifty years later, a 
tussle between the prime minister and the army continues.  The factors explained in 
Chapters I and II explain that the imbalance between civil-military relations in Pakistan is 
tilted toward the army’s side. Bhutto, the first elected civilian leader, who enjoyed 
massive popularity after thirteen years of military rule, also missed the opportunity to 
bring institutional balance and political culture in the country.  Bhutto revised the 
constitution, cut down the powers of the army chiefs, confined the military’s role, and 
created parallel institutions to dilute the powers of the military.  However, Bhutto was an 
authoritarian leader who, like his predecessors, failed to nurture the civilian institutions.  
Bhutto suppressed the judiciary, came down hard on the politicians and rigged the 
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elections, while using the state machinery.  The sacking of the army generals by Bhutto 
also created civil-military friction.  On July 5, 1977, the army overthrew Bhutto and took 
over the government by imposing martial law for the third time.  The deadlock between 
the opposition and the ruling party provided space for the army, while the judiciary 
legitimized the coup, as per the practice in vogue.  The coup was also legitimized and 
welcomed by the United States, which provided billions of dollars in military aid to the 
dictator.  I contend that the tensions in civil-military relations and the deadlock with the 
politicians provided occasion, opportunity and disposition to the army to intervene and 
overthrow Bhutto. 
Eleven years of Zia’s doctorial rule in Pakistan further institutionalized the army’s 
role in the country’s politics.  The army’s leadership interaction with the United States on 
the strategic level further created an imbalance in civil-military relations in Pakistan.  The 
Pakistani military also shaped itself into an autonomous political actor with all the 
capabilities to pull the strings of power politics from the sidelines, while transferring 
power to the civilians.  Zia  introduced a presidential system by bringing in constitutional 
amendments (article 58), which saw a continued power struggle between the civilian 
presidents,  prime ministers, the judiciary, and the army from 1988–1997, until the 
Nawaz Sharif government’s constitutional reforms, and did away with the powers of the 
presidents to dissolve assemblies. Between 1988 and 1997, four civilian governments 
were sent home as a result of the president and the prime ministers.  The army’s role, 
during this period, remained that of kingmaker and the ability to pull strings from the side 
lines. The army also played a contributory role in creating a new political party, IJI, later 
PML (N), in order to neutralize the power of Benazir Bhutto’s government.  The army, 
during this period, did not cause a coup, despite having been given many opportunities.  
This was because the army’s corporate interests, such as major policy decisions on the 
budget, external and internal security, including the Kashmir policy situation, were in line 




Like Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif made the same mistake, by consolidating his powers 
rather than building institutions.  The fourth coup occurred because of heightening civil-
military tensions and over the issue of the Kargil War between the president and Army 
Chief Musharraf.  These factors resulted in the coup d’état by Pervez Musharraf in 
October 1999.  All the coups in Pakistan were validated by the Supreme Court.  They 
were all welcomed by the people, as well.   
General Musharraf had to resign because of movement in the civil society. After 
Musharraf, General Kayani took over as the army chief, in 2007.  Kayani initially showed 
a real intent to remaining subservient to democratic civilian control.  Kayani, instead, 
averted a major clash between the opposition, government and the judiciary in 2009, 
although this was a golden opportunity for the army chief to take over.  He kept the 
military professional, sterile and apolitical, until the army’s prestige and corporate 
interests began to be jeopardized by the civilian government.  Publicly expressed 
concerns regarding clauses that impacted national security included in the so-called 
Kerry-Lugar bill, an attempt to bring the ISI under the control of the ministry of the 
interior by the prime minister, was refused by the army.  The recent eruption of serious 
differences between the prime minister and the army over the famous “memo gate 
scandal” and the open criticism of the Prime Minister against the army are indicators that 
present civil-military relations between the two institutions are at their lowest ebb. 
With regard to future civil-military relations in Pakistan, I contend that unless the 
military is kept autonomous, and its corporate interests are not threatened, the military 
will remain sterile and continue to cooperate with civilians.  I also argue that  future 
coups in Pakistan are a very remote possibility because all  four actors in the Pakistan 
power politics, (1) The judiciary, (2) the civil society and people, (3) the opposition 
political parties and, (4) the United States, (who always back the military regimes of 
Pakistan), have emerged as strong critics of military rule.  Further, the geopolitical 
changes in the world and international scenario do not favor the reemergence of military 
regimes.   
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Lately, the judiciary, the civil society, opposition and the United States have 
shown a strong aversion to military rule.  These factors show that a military coup in the 
country is a remote possibility. A midlevel coup in Pakistan is not possible, either, as the 
Pakistani army is a professional and hierarchical institution.  The chances of a coup 
within the military are negligible as the Pakistani military is a professional military and 
strongly maintains hierarchical values and strictly follows a chain of command.  The 
process of democratic consolidation in Pakistan is far from over; the civilian institutions 
are weak and politicians are divided. Therefore, the Pakistani army will continue to play 
the role of a dominant political institution in the country in the near future. 
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